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Preface
Service industries account for a growing share of many developed economies. At
the same time, international trade in services is growing. Service industries are also
subject to a range of regulations, which can constrain their performance and impose
costs on communities. Estimating the potential gains from liberalising service
industries requires that such regulations be identified and their effects on service
industries assessed.
In recent years, the Productivity Commission has played a leading international
research role in quantifying and analysing the effects of regulations on service
industries. Recent developments in this area of economic research have involved
important innovations in modelling and have identified the types and quality of data
required to strengthen the analysis of regulations.
In a collaborative project, researchers from the Commission and the Australian
National University quantified regulations affecting trade in banking (Kalirajan et
al. 2000) and telecommunications (Warren 2000a, 2000b), among other sectors, for
selected economies. Recently, Doove et al (2001) applied innovative methods to
estimate impacts of regulation on air transport, telecommunications and electricity
industries.
This paper builds on part of the above research by analysing the impacts on national
and global economies of removing trade barriers on two types of services:
telecommunications and financial services.
The results, while suggestive of the gains from liberalisation, are the product of
analytical methods that are still being refined and developed. They are being
published to facilitate further improvements, including by other researchers.
Feedback on this paper is welcomed.VIII ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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•   Barriers to trade in telecommunications and financial services are higher in
developing economies than developed economies.
•   Removing all barriers to trade in telecommunications and financial services is
estimated to increase world real GNP by some $US 48 billion. In both cases there
are significant differences in effects on GNP in different regions.
•   Regions with high barriers, offering significant scope to liberalise, gain most from
complete liberalisation. Regions with low barriers gain less. This indicates that
developing regions should have the strongest incentives to extend their GATS
commitments to liberalise in these sectors.
•   Removing barriers to trade in these sectors creates a number of effects, for the
world as a whole and for individual regions.  The model classifies these effects into
changes in the allocation of resources , returns to the world capital stock, the terms
of trade, product variety and foreign direct investment (FDI) income.
•   For the world as a whole, the gain from the reallocation of resources is found to
dominate the gains from an increase in returns to the world capital stock and
product variety when removing barriers to trade in telecommunications. When
removing barriers to trade in financial services, the gain from an increase in returns
to the world capital stock dominates the gains from the reallocation of resources and
product variety.
•   For regions with high barriers, the gains from removing barriers to trade in
telecommunications and financial services result from an improved allocation of
resources, increased capital via FDI inflows and increased product variety. For
regions with few barriers, the gains from removing barriers to trade in
telecommunications and financial services result from improvements in their terms
of trade and increased FDI income from investment in other regions.
•   Unlike the typical effects of removing barriers to goods trade, regions with the
highest barriers to trade experience the biggest expansion in telecommunications
and financial services output.
•   Commercial presence of foreign firms via FDI plays an important role in delivering
telecommunications and financial services. Thus it is vital to model FDI explicitly
when estimating the gains from liberalising trade in these sectors.OVERVIEW XI
Overview
At the present time various multilateral and plurilateral trade liberalisation
agreements are being negotiated around the world under the auspices of numerous
organisations, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC). There are also an increasing number of bilateral
agreements being negotiated by members of these organisations. Almost all of these
negotiations include trade in various services. As such, understanding the likely
economic effects of liberalisation of services trade is important for bringing
transparency to the domestic and international trade policy debate.
This paper quantifies the economic impact of complete liberalisation of trade in two
important services sectors, telecommunications and financial services. WTO
members have undertaken scheduled commitments to liberalise these sectors at least
partially (The Secretariat of the Council for Trade in Services 1998a, 1998b). By
quantifying the economic effects of complete liberalisation in telecommunications
and financial services, it is hoped that this study will  illuminate for WTO members
the gains that might be achieved by extending their commitments to liberalise these
sectors.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) identifies two types of
barriers to trade in services: barriers to market access which restrict the
establishment and ongoing operations of all firms in a sector, and restrictions on
national treatment which impede the establishment and ongoing operations of
foreign firms in a sector. Market access barriers are generally non-discriminatory
barriers, whereas restrictions on national treatment are discriminatory. Market
access barriers are significant in telecommunications, whereas restrictions on
national treatment are significant in financial services. Barriers to trade in
telecommunications and financial services are higher in developing regions than in
developed regions.
This paper uses recent estimates of the magnitude of these barriers for
telecommunications and financial services. These are barriers to trade remaining
after full implementation of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade agreements.
FTAP2, a ‘computable general equilibrium (CGE) model’ of world trade and
investment, is adopted for analysis of the effects. Using this model, completely
liberalising trade in telecommunications and financial services is estimated to
increase world real gross national product (GNP) by 0.2 per cent. The model used toLIBERALISING TRADE
IN SERVICES
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estimate these effects only captures the static gains from trade liberalisation. As
such, the dynamic effects of trade liberalisation are not captured in the results. Thus,
the estimated gains from the liberalisation can be interpreted as the lower bounds of
all  potential gains to regional and world economies.
Box 1 Key features of FTAP2
FTAP2 is a multi-country model which embodies interactions between 19 regions and
eight sectors. It models the activities of three economic ‘agents’ in each region: firms,
government and a representative household (that is, private citizens). The
representative household is assumed to own all primary factors of production: land,
natural resources, capital and labour. The supplies of land, natural resources and
labour are given in each region. Land and natural resources are used only by the
primary industries sector and in fixed quantities. Labour is assumed to be mobile
among sectors within each region, but not between regions. Capital is mobile among
sectors within each region and between regions.
All regions have their own firms operating in all sectors. The model assumes that all
local firms in a given sector are identical in size but produce slightly differentiated
products. It is further assumed that, in each sector of a given region, the firms are
multinational enterprises with their headquarters located domestically and wholly
owned affiliates operating simultaneously in the same sectors of other foreign regions.
The model assumes that the objective of a multinational firm is to maximise the return
for its home region’s investor (capital owner). As the firm has special knowledge about
the sector in which it operates, it will relocate its sector-specific operations between
home and foreign regions and across all foreign regions until the post-tax rate of return
on capital is maximised. This involves direct investment overseas, which facilitates the
firm’s commercial presence in foreign markets. The multinational firm of a given sector
combines its home-sourced capital with land, labour and other intermediate inputs,
obtained from the regions where its operation is located, to produce goods and
services for local consumers and exports. In equilibrium, the expected rates of return to
capital are equalised for all firms originating from the same region, but not for firms
located in the same regions.
The global gains from removing barriers to trade in these sectors come from three
sources: improvements in the allocation of resources, increased returns to the world
stock of capital, and increased product variety. Individual regions also experience
these effects, as well as other effects from changes in their terms of trade and
income from foreign direct investment (FDI). For individual regions, these five
effects can cause either gains or losses in real GNP. High barrier regions gain from
improvements in the allocation of resources, increased capital via inward FDI,
increased product variety, and lose from changes in their terms of trade and
increased payments on inward FDI. Low barrier regions gain from changes in theirOVERVIEW XIII
terms of trade and increased FDI income, and lose from the capital allocative effect
on output and product variety, and decreased capital via outward FDI.
Liberalising trade in telecommunications is estimated to increase world GNP by 0.1
per cent (roughly $US 24 billion), with almost all of the gains coming from
removing non-discriminatory barriers. Liberalising trade in financial services is also
estimated to increase world GNP by 0.1 per cent. The nature of the barriers to trade
in financial services means that almost all of the gains come from removing trade
barriers that discriminate against foreign firms. However, the gains for most regions
are highest when all  restrictions are removed, despite significant variation in
regional GNP gains.
The global gains from liberalising telecommunications are overwhelmingly derived
from improvements in the allocation of resources. The scale of non-discriminatory
barriers to trade in telecommunications causes a significant increase in domestic
capital and labour and foreign capital in this sector, at the expense of other sectors,
when these trade barriers are removed. This is captured as an improvement in the
allocation of resources. The global gains from liberalising financial services are
mainly due to an increase in the returns to the world capital stock. The importance
of discriminatory barriers to trade in financial services means that their reduction
causes a significant increase in foreign-owned capital in this sector, at the expense
of domestically owned capital. This is captured as an increase in the returns to the
world capital stock.
The benefits from liberalising trade in these two sectors are distributed to almost all
regions, according to the model used in this study. The largest gains accrue to high-
barrier developing regions while smaller gains accrue to low-barrier developed
regions. The modelling indicates that developing regions have strong incentives to
extend their GATS commitments to liberalise in these sectors. The modelling also
indicates that commercial presence of foreign firms via FDI is an important mode of
delivering telecommunications and financial services. So it is vital to model
changes in FDI when estimating gains from liberalising trade in these sectors.INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
Trade in services is a rapidly growing area of international trade. Since the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was implemented  in 1995, multilateral
trade in a few key services sectors has been liberalised further. In most countries,
however, barriers to trade in services are still significant, which implies that
potentially large gains could be expected from further liberalisation.
In 1999, a report by the WTO Council for Trade in Services noted that there had
been no comprehensive empirical study of the effects of multilateral liberalisation
of services trade.1 Despite some research on this issue,2 the impact of multilateral
liberalisation of trade in services, especially individual service sectors, on
economies and the world as a whole, has yet to be rigorously assessed.
This study provides a quantitative analysis of the effects of trade liberalisation on
two large service sectors: telecommunications and financial services. WTO
members have already undertaken scheduled commitments to liberalise these two
sectors. These commitments, however, are only the beginning of a long process of
negotiation towards full liberalisation. Recent studies indicate that despite the
agreements reached, most WTO members’ commitments to liberalising trade are
only partial in these two services sectors (The Secretariat of the Council for Trade
in Services 1998a, 1998b). Extensive negotiations are still needed for WTO
members to commit to more open trade policies, not only in telecommunications
and financial services but also in other service sectors (WTO Secretariat 1999).
By quantifying the effects of complete liberalisation in telecommunications and
financial services, this study is aimed at illuminating for WTO members the gains
that might be achieved by  further trade liberalisation in these two sectors.3
                                             
1  ‘…[T]o the knowledge of the Secretariat, there is not a single empirical study analysing on a
comprehensive basis – across countries, sectors and modes – the effects on services trade
attributable to scheduled commitments.’ (The Secretariat of the Council for Trade in Services
1999).
2 See for example Hertel (1999), Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (1999), McKibbin (1999) and
Dee and Hanslow (2000).
3 The analysis in this study includes some regions that are not currently WTO members such as
China and Taiwan, although both of these economies are expected to become WTO members in
the near future. As such, the analysis encompasses a greater coverage of regions of the world than
just those regions represented by the WTO.LIBERALISING TRADE
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Previous studies have attempted to quantify the effects of liberalising services trade
using a CGE approach.4 A recent Productivity Commission study (Dee and
Hanslow 2000) addressed some of their shortcomings. Dee and Hanslow (2000)
uses a three-sector multi-region CGE model (FTAP), with international trade and
investment flows, to quantify the effects of removing barriers to trade in aggregate
services. It finds that complete liberalisation of trade in services leads to a gain of
around $US136 billion or 0.46 per cent of world real gross national product (GNP).
The gains vary among regions: the largest gains are projected to go to the regions
with the highest barriers to trade in services, while regions with low barriers are
projected to experience smaller gains or, in some cases, losses.
The inclusion of a single services sector in Dee and Hanslow (2000) confines the
analysis largely to the regional effects of trade liberalisation. The GATS provides
for sectoral negotiations because it requires ‘positive listing’.5 A disaggregated
approach should provide a better breakdown of the sectoral effects of trade
liberalisation. This study extends Dee and Hanslow (2000) to focus on two
individual sectors: telecommunications and financial services. The FTAP model is
modified to suit the special characteristics of these two sectors, and like Dee and
Hanslow (2000), it incorporates recent studies by Warren (1999) and Kalirajan et al.
(1999) to provide barrier estimates for these two sectors, but in a more targeted
way. The database used here allows for the full implementation of the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations (UR) to measure the effects of removing
barriers to trade in telecommunications and financial services.6 The model database
did not originally contain distinct telecommunications and financial services
sectors. These were disaggregated using output shares based on stylised facts as the
information on regional services sectors is limited. As such, the results presented in
this study partly depend on the reliability of these stylised facts. In future work,
these shares should be drawn from regional input-output tables with the necessary
sectoral detail for more services, including those examined here.
                                             
4 For example, see Brown et al. (1995), Petri (1997), Hertel (1999) Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr
(1999) and McKibbin (1999). Most of these are somewhat limited in their approach to modelling
trade in services. Brown et al. (1995) and McKibbin (1999) model foreign portfolio, rather than
direct, investment in services, one of the key vehicles by which services are traded
internationally. Petri (1997) liberalises trade in goods and FDI in services, but uses barrier data
that is outdated. Hertel (1999) does not liberalise FDI in services only cross-border trade.
Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (1999) only model FDI in services that are used as intermediate
inputs into production, not for final demand.
5 Under the positive list approach, the requirement is to list those sectors or measures in respect of
which obligations are to be assumed. Under the negative list approach, governments must specify
the sectors or measures to which obligations do not apply (WTO Secretariat 1996).
6 The UR is expected to lead to little or no liberalisation in services (Hoekman 1995) and none was
assumed in this implementation of the agreements.INTRODUCTION 3
The paper is organised as follows. The remainder of this chapter highlights some
unique features of services trade and how they influence liberalisation of trade in
telecommunications and financial services. Chapter 2 outlines the analytical
framework, FTAP2, a multi-region, multi-sector global general equilibrium model
incorporating FDI flows. Chapter 3 discusses the nature of trade liberalisation
policies under the GATS and the main economic effects of these policy changes.
The estimated effects of trade liberalisation in telecommunications and financial
services are presented separately and discussed in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6
summarises the policy implications of this study and suggests avenues for further
research.
1.1 The GATS and unique features of services trade
The GATS framework
The GATS negotiated during the UR is perhaps the most significant addition to the
“rules” of the multilateral trading system since the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) in 1948. The GATS extends internationally agreed rules and
commitments into a rapidly growing area of international trade. The GATS
represents a major step beyond the GATT. It extends the GATT’s principles not
only to border measures, but also to regulations relating to access to domestic
markets for domestic and foreign service suppliers. Unlike the GATT, however,
many of the important rules of the GATS apply only when commitments are made
for particular sectors (WTO Secretariat 1999). This gives a much greater sectoral
focus to trade liberalisation in services than for goods under the GATT.
At the end of the UR negotiations in 1993, negotiations in many key service sectors
were incomplete. Sectoral negotiations continued and agreements were reached on
basic telecommunications and financial services in February and December 1997,
respectively (see box 1.1). The new commitments by WTO members took effect
from January 1998 for telecommunications and from January 1999 for financial
services (WTO Secretariat 1999). Even so, most WTO members have made only
partial commitments to opening trade in these sectors (The Secretariat of the
Council for Trade in Services 1998a, 1998b). Therefore, estimating the effects of
complete liberalisation may show WTO members the consequences of increasing
their scheduled commitments in future trade negotiations.LIBERALISING TRADE
IN SERVICES
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Box 1.1 The GATS after the Uruguay Round
Attached to the GATS are additional agreements called ‘protocols’, which deal with the
results of subsequent negotiations.
•   Second protocol: financial services (adopted 21 July 1995, entered into force 1
September 1996)
•   Third protocol: movement of natural persons (adopted 21 July 1995, entered into
force 30 January 1996)
•   Fourth protocol: basic telecommunications (adopted 30 April 1997, entered into
force 5 February 1998)
•   Fifth protocol: financial services (adopted 14 November 1997, entered into force 1
March 1999
The GATS contains a ‘built-in agenda’ requiring a new round of negotiations to begin in
January 2000.
Source: WTO (2001).
The nature of trade in services
Understanding the issues raised by liberalisation of services trade requires
understanding of the unique features of trade in services. Services are different in
nature from goods. Goods can be transported and consumed or used away from
their production location. The consumers of many services, however, cannot be
easily separated, geographically, from the producer of the services.
The GATS sets out a comprehensive and broad definition of trade in services in
terms of four different modes of delivery:
•   cross-border supply;
•   consumption abroad;
•   commercial presence in the consuming country; and
•   the presence of natural persons (WTO Secretariat 1999).
This definition is important for understanding the special features of trade in
services and the policy issues involved in liberalising this trade.
Cross-border supply resembles most closely merchandise goods: it is the service
itself that crosses national borders, such as international telephone calls and
international financial transactions.INTRODUCTION 5
Consumption abroad refers to the supply of a service in one country to the
consumers of another country. This may involve, for example, consumers travelling
to the supplying country for tourist or educational purposes. Cross-border supply
and consumption abroad are similar modes of delivery in that they do not require
suppliers to be admitted to the consuming country.
Commercial presence of a foreign supplier, via FDI or joint ventures, in the territory
of another country is another mode of delivery.
The movement of natural persons can be seen as an extension of commercial
presence. For example, the establishment of a local affiliate by a foreign service
supplier may require some foreign managers or specialists to be employed. It can
also be seen as an important mode in its own right, as is the case with personal
services such as immigrant house maids.
For many economies, cross-border supply and commercial presence are important
modes of supplying foreign telecommunications and financial services, with
consumption abroad and the presence of natural persons being less important
modes. Currently, cross-border supply is still the dominant mode of trade in these
services. In the mid-1990s the share of cross-border supply in world output of
telecommunications and financial services was 5.9 and 3.4 per cent respectively,
compared with 1.0 and 1.7 per cent for commercial presence respectively.7 The
apparent low share of commercial presence in consuming regions is most likely a
result of restrictions currently in place in these two sectors. Therefore there is great
potential for expanding trade in telecommunications and financial services through
increased commercial presence of foreign service suppliers, if trade barriers in these
two sectors were to be removed.
1.2 Gains from liberalising trade in
telecommunications and financial services
The gains from merchandise trade depend on changes in production and
consumption induced by expanded opportunities of exchange. Liberalising trade in
services is also expected to confer gains to liberalising countries. However, the
nature of services trade means the gains from trade may not be the same as from
trade in goods. To trace the source of gains in services trade an understanding of the
effect of barriers to trade in services is required.
                                             
7 By way of comparison, cross-border supply as a proportion of world output of goods is 21 per
cent. These estimates are taken from the FTAP2 database, the construction of which is
summarised in chapter 2.LIBERALISING TRADE
IN SERVICES
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The existence of diverse modes of supply makes the identification of barriers to
trade in services a complicated task. Any restriction imposed on the supply of a
service by any of the four modes of delivery should be regarded as a barrier to trade.
Barriers can range from conventional border regulations restricting the cross-border
supply of services, such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, to domestic regulations
restricting the establishment of a foreign company.
Of all the barriers to trade in services, restrictions on cross-border supply are
probably the least effective. First, the nature of some services (for example, those
transmitted electronically) makes it difficult for governments to monitor and
quantify the level of trading activities, let alone to impose any enforceable
restrictions on these activities. Second and perhaps more important, some cross-
border services may be quite different from domestic services, so there may be no
pressure to restrict their cross-border trade. Contrast this with cross-border trade in
goods, where many imported goods are directly substitutable for their domestic
counterparts. Many imported telecommunication services are quite different from
domestic telecommunication services, in that they are not substitutable for each
other in intermediate input use or final demand. For example, imported
telecommunication services are combined with domestic telecommunication
services to deliver international telephone calls. Imported financial services have
similar characteristics in this regard to imported telecommunications.8
Restricting imported telecommunications and financial services harm domestic as
well as foreign producers of these services. For example, restrictions on imported
telecommunication services make international telephone calls more expensive.
Reduced consumption of international telephone calls implies lower demand for
imported and domestic telecommunication services used as inputs to international
telephone calls. This effect is quite different from that of restricting cross-border
trade in most goods and services, where domestic producers of the similar good or
service usually benefit from the import protection.
Gains from trade in services also come from reallocation of primary factors of
production across borders. This reallocation of factors is associated with removing
barriers to commercial presence of foreign service suppliers. Compared with cross-
border supply, telecommunications and financial services delivered through
commercial presence of foreign firms potentially represent a much larger portion of
total trade in these services.
Restricting the entry to, or the operation of a firm in, a sector is a restriction on the
mobility of the primary factors of production used by that firm. Imposing a barrier
to foreign commercial presence distorts primary factor markets, generating a ‘rent’
                                             
8 This is discussed further in chapter 2.INTRODUCTION 7
(a mark up of price over opportunity cost) to incumbents and a ‘tax’ on local capital
users. It generates losses in allocative efficiency for the domestic economy and for
the world as a whole.9 Removing a barrier to commercial presence returns the rent
from incumbents to capital users and other capital suppliers. With a liberalised
market, foreign firms are able to exploit new profit opportunities by increasing
investment in the local economy, which in turn increases economic activity in the
receiving economy.
A more efficient use of global resources lowers the cost of producing
telecommunications and financial services which benefits consumers, and producers
who use them as intermediate inputs.10 The world economy as a whole benefits
from an improved allocation of resources and cheaper services. For individual
regions, however, the size of the benefits varies depending on trade barriers and
trade linkages.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the telecommunications and financial
services sectors have some characteristics that are distinct from trade in most goods
and services. It implies that analysing the effects of liberalising trade in these
sectors requires a clear sectoral perspective, in order to accommodate the
differences. To quantify the impact of liberalising trade in these services on regional
economies, in a consistent manner, requires a general equilibrium framework. This
framework should incorporate not only cross-border trade flows but also bilateral
foreign capital allocation at the sectoral level, so that services trade captures cross-
border supply and foreign commercial presence.
                                             
9 Appendix A contains a diagrammatic illustration of the comparative static gains from removing
barriers to commercial presence.
10 In addition, a region may benefit from positive externalities associated with the inflow of




The model used in this study is FTAP2, which is a modified version of the FTAP
model applied in Dee and Hanslow (2000).1 The FTAP model was developed at the
Productivity Commission from the GTAP model, a multiregion CGE trade model
(Hertel 1997). The main features distinguishing FTAP2 from a standard CGE trade
model, such as GTAP, are:
•   its description of bilateral capital flows between regions at the sectoral level,
primarily to account for the supply of services abroad through commercial
presence;
•   the treatment of the cross-border supply of some services is different from that
for most goods and other services; and
•   the treatment of barriers to the delivery of telecommunications and financial
services.
FTAP2 is implemented using the GEMPACK software suite (Harrison and Pearson
1996).
The main features of FTAP2 are described here, with special emphasis on three key
areas: the commercial presence of foreign firms, cross-border supply of services and
barriers to services trade. A more detailed description of the theoretical features is
contained in appendix B.
2.1 Commercial presence of foreign affiliates
Model structure
The activities of three economic agents are modelled in each region: firms, a
representative household and government. The household owns all primary factors
of production: land, natural resources, capital and labour. The supplies of land,
natural resources and labour are given in each region. Land and natural resources
                                             
1 FTAP is an acronym for ‘Foreign direct investment and Trade Analysis Project’. For details of




are used only by the primary industries sector and in fixed quantities. Labour is
assumed to be mobile among sectors within each region, but not between regions.
Capital is mobile among sectors within each region and between regions.
All regions have their own firms operating in all sectors. It is assumed that all local
firms in a given sector are identical in size but produce slightly differentiated
products. It is further assumed that, in each sector of a given region, the firms are
multinational enterprises with their headquarters located domestically and wholly
owned affiliates operating simultaneously in the same sectors of other foreign
regions.
In each region the household, as the owner of capital, also represents a collective
investor. The objective of the capital owner is to maximise the total return on the
region’s capital by investing in locally-owned firms, and their foreign affiliates, of
every sector.
The objective of these multinational firms is to maximise the return for its home
region’s investor (capital owner). As the firm has special knowledge about the
sector in which it operates, it will relocate its sector-specific operations between
home and foreign regions and across all foreign regions until the post-tax rate of
return on capital is maximised. This involves direct investment overseas, which
facilitates the firm’s commercial presence in foreign markets. The multinational
firm of a given sector combines its home-sourced capital with land, labour and other
intermediate inputs, obtained from the regions where its operation is located, to
produce goods and services for local consumers and exports.
Two levels of direct capital investment are observed. The multinational firm in a
given sector makes the decision to invest in its own operations within a given sector
across regions, while the regional investor makes the decision to invest in the
region’s own firms across sectors. The regional investor can only invest its capital
overseas through its investment in the region’s multinational firms.
Both levels of direct investment are driven by the same return maximisation
behaviour. At the firm level, for each multinational firm, the return can only be
maximised if its home parent firm and all its overseas affiliates generate an equal
rate of return on every unit of capital they use.2 At the regional level, on the other
hand, for the regional capital owner, the return to total regional capital can only be
maximised if locally originated multinational firms across all sectors generate an
equal rate of return on every unit of capital they use. This capital reallocation
process ensures that, in the absence of barriers to capital mobility, the expected rates
                                             
2 It is assumed that the operations of the parent firm and its overseas affiliates in different locations
are separable and independent from each other.LIBERALISING TRADE
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of return to capital used by all firms originating from the same region will converge
over the course of a simulation.
The expected rate of return is risk-adjusted. Capital investment involves uncertainty
and risk. A high market rate of return may not be achievable because of the
potential high risk involved. Therefore, when investors make investment decisions
they normally adjust the market rate of return by the probability of not receiving it.
The rate of return that the capital owner responds to in the model is defined as the
risk-adjusted or the expected rate of return, rather than the observed market rate of
return.3
In equilibrium, the expected rates of return to capital are equalised for all firms
originating from the same region, but not for firms located in the same regions. It is
assumed that capital assets owned by different regions may not have the same
quality or composition. For instance, foreign affiliates in a host region may have
superior technologies or new products, which can generate higher rates of return to
their capital than those generated by their local counterparts. The concept of
‘knowledge capital’ may account, in part, for the apparently high rates of return
enjoyed by multinational corporations.4 Based on this consideration, capital is
assumed to be region-specific and mobile only between a region’s own firms. There
is no convergence of rates of return across the capital owned by different regions
over the long run.
In the model, capital stock owned by a region may not be equal to the capital its
firms use in their production, depending on its foreign debt or credit position. In the
current model no repayment of debt principal is considered. It is therefore assumed
that the shares of net foreign debt in government and household incomes for each
region are fixed and stable over time. Net foreign debts are serviced only by paying
interest at an internationally fixed rate.5 As no automatic borrowing is allowed, the
net foreign debt position moves only with changes in a region’s income.
On the demand side, from a host region’s perspective, each host region has two
types of firms in each sector: domestic firms (the parent firm of the local
multinational) and various foreign affiliates. Firms are identifiable by location
(sector of the host region) and by ownership (home region). Foreign affiliates
                                             
3 This is different from the FTAP model, which uses market rates of return to capital taken directly
from Disclosure (1999) and assumes no equalisation of rates of return is assumed. Instead, capital
is assumed to be firm-specific and allocated between sectors and regions in a set of nested CET
functions, adapted from Petri (1997). By assuming arbitrage of expected rates of return, FTAP2
implies a greater degree of capital mobility than FTAP.
4 See Markusen (1995) for a theory of FDI and multinational firms consistent with this treatment.
5 This is different from FTAP in which foreign debt can be changed through bond trading.ANALYTICAL
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combine their home region’s capital with the host region’s labour, land and natural
resources to produce goods and services for the host region’s consumers and
exports. Within each sector, domestic firms and foreign affiliates produce
differentiated products.
Consumers in the host region are assumed to allocate a fixed nominal share of their
income among goods and services. Consumers’ utility is assumed to increase with
the number of varieties available for a product as well as with the quantities of
different products.6 Foreign produced goods and services can be delivered via
cross-border supply or by foreign affiliates in the host region. Most imported goods
and services are assumed to be imperfect substitutes with their domestically
produced equivalents. However, imported telecommunication and financial services
delivered via cross-border supply are assumed to be non-substitutable with
domestically produced services for the reasons to be discussed below (see section
2.2).
Given these characteristics, an increase in the quantity demanded of services
provided by foreign affiliates in a host region increases the commercial presence of
these affiliates. An increase in the quantity demanded can be triggered by a fall in
their output prices and production costs (that is, an increase in supply).
These changes may be brought about by changes in trade barriers.7 For instance,
barriers to services provided by foreign affiliates increase the price of these services
and reduce the quantity demanded. Barriers to FDI increase the cost of foreign
capital and reduce the quantity demanded by foreign affiliates. Both types of
barriers serve to discourage the commercial presence of foreign affiliates. When
these barriers are removed, more foreign affiliates are encouraged to enter the
liberalising region or sector. This reduces or eliminates the rents earned by existing
foreign affiliates and thus reduces the cost of capital and the price of the services
provided by foreign affiliates, both of which lead to an increase in the quantity
demanded of foreign capital and services provided by foreign affiliates.
Model database
The database specifies the commercial presence of foreign affiliates by origin
(home region) and destination (sector of a host region), with a complete input-
                                             
6 The model assumes large-group monopolistic competition as applied by Francois, McDonald and
Nordstrom (1995), such that increased choice for a product is measured by the quantity of output
in a sector. A small proportion of gains arising from increased output is attributed to this
increased choice between varieties of a product.
7 For a detailed discussion on trade barriers see section 2.3.LIBERALISING TRADE
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output structure defined for each foreign affiliate.8 The database provides the same
regional detail as in Dee and Hanslow (2000) but with greater sectoral detail. It
divides the world into 19 regions (see table 2.1) and each regional economy into
eight sectors, six of which are services sectors. They are:
•   construction;
•   (wholesale and retail) trade and transport;
•   communications;9
•   finance, insurance and business services;10
•   other services; and
•   dwellings.
Non-services sectors are aggregated into primary and secondary industries.
Table 2.1 reports the share of FDI in the capital stocks of the telecommunications
and financial services sectors of each host region. The information is based on
statistics for the mid-1990s. The share of FDI for the world as a whole is relatively
small, accounting for less than 1.5 per cent of the capital stock in each sector.
Developed regions usually have a larger foreign commercial presence than
developing regions. The low foreign presence in many developing countries and
regions, for example China, are likely to be the result of high barriers.
                                             
8 The construction of the FDI stocks database is briefly described in appendix C and documented
in Verikios and Zhang (2001).
9 Despite this sector including non-telecommunication services (as defined by the GATS) such as
postal services, liberalising barriers to trade in telecommunications is generalised to the whole
sector. Thus from this point forward, this sector will be referred to as telecommunications only.
10 Despite this sector including non-financial services (as defined by the GATS) such as business
services, liberalising barriers to trade in financial services is generalised to the whole sector. Thus
from this point forward, this sector will be referred to as financial services only.ANALYTICAL
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Table 2.1 Shares of FDI in sectoral capital stocks by host region, mid-
1990s (per cent)
Region Telecommunications Financial services
Australia 1.33 0.38









Hong Kong 1.42 12.90
Taiwan 0.20 0.42
Canada 0.27 4.62
United States of America 1.11 0.85
Mexico 0.19 4.14
Chile 0.57 0.35
Rest of the Cairns Groupa 0.40 0.98
European Union 1.94 1.65
Rest of the Worldb 0.02 0.37
World 0.92 1.35
a This region is composed of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay. b This region is almost entirely
composed of non-APEC developing countries and economies in transition from socialism.
Source: FTAP2 database.
2.2 Cross-border supply of services
FTAP2 recognises a fundamental attribute of cross-border supply of
telecommunications and financial services that differentiates them from most other
goods and services. Normally, imported goods and services delivered via cross-
border supply are substitutable for their domestically produced counterparts.
However, there are exceptions for some services. Cross-border telecommunication
services, for instance, cannot be directly consumed by domestic users. Instead,
along with domestic telecommunication services they represent an input into
international telephone calls, which is the service that final users actually purchase.
This feature is captured in the balance of payments accounts (see the first paragraph
of box 2.1).
Cross-border financial services are similar in nature to cross-border
telecommunication services. Cross-border financial services, along with domestic
financial services, are inputs into international financial transactions, such asLIBERALISING TRADE
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drawing a cheque in foreign currency. Consumers purchase international financial
transactions, but do not directly purchase cross-border financial services. Therefore,
cross-border financial services are not readily substitutable with any domestically
provided financial services. This feature is also captured in the balance of payments
accounts (see the second paragraph of box 2.1).
Box 2.1 Imports and exports of telecommunications and financial
services: what do these data represent?
For telecommunications, an import recorded in Australia’s balance of payments data
reflects a portion of a larger service such as of an international telephone call. Take, for
example, a telephone call made by an Australian resident in Canberra to a friend in
Washington DC. This call is composed of two parts. The charge by the domestic carrier
which comprises the cost of connecting from Canberra to Sydney (the border), and the
charge by a United States carrier of connecting from Los Angeles to Washington DC.
The first component of this call counts as part of domestic production, while the second
component is counted in the balance of payments as an import of telecommunications
from the United States to Australia. Between Sydney and Los Angeles the call passes
through the telephone cable lying at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean (McLennan, K.,
ABS, Canberra, pers. comm., 15 July 2000).
In the case of financial services, an import of financial services recorded in Australia’s
balance of payments reflects a portion of a larger service in the form of an international
financial transaction, examples of which include the purchase of foreign currencies,
drawing a cheque in a foreign currency and transferring funds overseas. The data on
imports of financial services comprises two components. Direct explicit fees reflect the
service provided such as brokerage fees or account fees, and an indirect service
charge captures the margin on lending and borrowing rates. All such international
financial transactions are provided via a resident financial institution. The total charge
to an Australian resident for such a transaction service comprises two separate
charges. One charge is levied by a domestic financial institution for its services as an
intermediary, and another charge is levied by the foreign financial institution
concerned. The first charge is counted as part of domestic production, whereas the
second charge is counted in the balance of payments as an import by Australia of
financial services from the country where the foreign financial institution resides
(O’Day, D., ABS, Canberra, pers. comm., 30 August 2000).
FTAP2 uses regional input-output tables from the GTAP 4 database (McDougall,
Elbehri and Truong 1998). This database does not distinguish between international
telephone calls (or financial transactions) and domestic telephone calls (or financial
transactions), neither in terms of intermediate input usage or final demand. The only
distinction made is between imported telecommunication services (or financial
services) provided via cross-border supply and domestic telecommunication
services (or financial services), which include the domestic component of
international telephone calls (or financial transactions). Consequently the elasticityANALYTICAL
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of substitution between domestic and cross-border telecommunications and
financial services are assumed to be close to zero for intermediate input usage and
final demand. For the same reason, telecommunications and financial services
delivered via cross-border supply from different regions are also assumed to be non-
substitutable with each other, so these elasticities are also set to zero.11
The nonsubstitutability of domestic and imported telecommunications and financial
services implies that domestic suppliers of these services do not directly compete
with foreign service suppliers in cross-border trade. However, they do compete with
each other in the host region’s domestic market.
Finally, the elasticities of substitution for all other imported and domestically
produced varieties of goods and services remain the same as those used in Dee and
Hanslow (2000).
2.3 Barriers to trade in telecommunications and
financial services
Commercial presence and cross-border supply are two important modes of
international trade in telecommunications and financial services, and barriers to
trade in these two sectors are usually imposed via these two modes of delivery.12
Estimating the effects of these barriers is important for modelling the effects of
trade liberalisation in these two services. Thus, of the four modes of delivery set out
in the GATS, only commercial presence and cross-border supply are explicitly
modelled here. It is assumed that the effects of the other two modes, consumption
abroad and the presence of natural persons, are implicitly captured by the first two
modes of delivery.
Modelling trade barriers
A common effect of any barrier to trade in a service is to reduce supply of the
service which increases the price for users. In a general equilibrium framework,
                                             
11 Allowing substitution between imported telecommunication services (or financial services)
delivered via cross-border supply and domestic telecommunications (or financial services) causes
this type of imported telecommunication services to rise at the expense of domestic
telecommunication services if the relative price of cross-border telecommunication services falls.
This result seems unrealistic.
12 To the extent that the movement of natural persons is associated with the location of production
abroad and this movement is greater than one year (that is, permanent), barriers to this movement
are accounted for in FTAP2 by barriers to FDI flows. Transactions associated with the temporary
(less than one year) movement of persons are generally captured in cross-border trade statistics.LIBERALISING TRADE
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there are two possible interpretations with regard to the effects of barriers on
economic activity. The first views these barriers purely as cost-increasing for users
and producers of the service, with no corresponding increase in prices received by
factors owners and/or intermediate-input producers. The removal of such a barrier is
modelled via a productivity improvement in the services sector concerned. The
productivity improvement reduces the price of the service for users and producers,
leading to an increase in consumption and production of the service. In a general
equilibrium framework, this approach is seen as equivalent to a ‘free lunch’. The
resulting increase in real GNP is ‘paid for’ by a technological improvement that has
been imposed on the model from the outside. This is the approach adopted in Hertel
et al. (1999) and Hertel (1999).13 In these studies, the barriers are represented as
cost-increasing for firms using imported intermediate inputs in which trade is
restricted.14 Removal of trade barriers is assumed to create ‘import-augmenting
technical change’ for firms in a host region, which is equal to the measured tariff
equivalent.15
An alternative way to represent barriers to trade in a service is by linking the
expected reduction in the price of the service for users to the elimination of rents
earned by either the producers of the service, factors owners or both. This is similar
to the loss in tax revenue when import tariffs are removed. In this case, the barriers
are both cost-increasing for users, and rent-creating for producers and/or factor
owners. The barriers create rents to producers and/or factors used in the sector in
which trade is restricted. These producers and factors earn supranormal rates of
return compared with their counterparts in other unrestricted sectors. More
importantly, the barriers also create losses in efficiency for the economy as a
whole.16
Modelling the removal of these barriers then involves removal of these rents. The
loss in rents for producers and factor owners in the restricted sector ‘pays’ for the
increase in the real income of factor owners or consumers elsewhere. For the
economy as a whole, however, net gains accrue from the gains in efficiency. This is
a conventional approach to modelling services trade liberalisation within a general
equilibrium framework, adopted in Petri (1997) and Dee and Hanslow (2000). This
                                             
13 Where imports of goods are restricted by imposing tariffs, trade liberalisation generates lower
prices for users and increased GNP for exporting and (usually) importing regions, at the expense
of domestic producers and tariff revenue.
14 Both of these studies use the standard GTAP model for their analysis. The GTAP model does
not distinguish foreign affiliates from domestic firms in a host region. Thus the effect of trade
liberalisation can only be captured in the form of changes in the cross-border supply of services.
15 These tariff equivalents are drawn from Hoekman (1995) and Francois (1999).
16 The losses in efficiency are usually referred to as ‘Harberger triangles’. See appendix A for a
diagrammatic representation of these losses.ANALYTICAL
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approach is more in line with trade theory and the effects of limiting market entry
(Lipsey 1971). This is also the approach adopted in this study for
telecommunications and financial services liberalisation.
Estimated tax equivalents of barriers to trade
As services are traded via various modes there are also various ways that trade in
services can be restricted. These restrictions can be classified into two broad types:
restrictions imposed on the delivery of the service itself or restrictions imposed on
the use of primary factors used in producing the service. These barriers create
distortions in either product markets or factor markets, or both.
If a barrier is imposed on the entry of a factor to a particular sector and it is binding,
the observed rate of return to that factor (that is, to the quantity of the factor that is
employed in the sector) will be higher than would otherwise be the case. In the case
of a quantitative (non-tax) restriction, the owner of the restricted factor used in that
sector receives a ‘quota’ rent above the normal rate of return, which also pushes up
the price of the service to users. If a barrier is imposed on trade in the service itself,
the price of the service will also be higher than otherwise would be the case. In this
case, a ‘quota’ rent goes to the producer.
Both types of barriers contribute to a shortage in the host region for the service and,
therefore, a higher price level than would otherwise be the case. The aim of barrier
measurement is to estimate the price distortion due to the barriers at the current
level of consumption.
Similar to Dee and Hanslow (2000), trade barriers in FTAP2 are represented as one
of two types of ad valorem tax equivalents: the price of firms’ output and the rental
price of capital used by firms. The former measures barriers to ongoing operations
of a firm while the latter measures the barriers to the establishment of a firm.
Domestic firms and foreign affiliates in a host region may face different barriers to
ongoing operations and establishment. Thus there are, altogether, four different tax
equivalent estimates for trade barriers in the model database. These tax equivalents
for all 19 regions are listed in table 2.2. Appendix D contains a description of the
sources of these estimates and the methods used in their construction. These
estimates are representative of barriers which were in place in 1997.LIBERALISING TRADE
IN SERVICES
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Table 2.2 Estimated tax equivalents of post-UR barriers to trade in
telecommunications and financial services (per cent)
Telecommunications Financial services
Output Capital Output Capital
Region
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Australia -- 1.4 1.4 - 1.4 - 43.3
NZ -- 1.3 1.3 - 1.9 - 8.5
Japan -- 1.8 1.8 5.8 7.7 - 3.0
Korea 2.5 4.9 4.8 9.2 14.9 18.6 - 80.7
Indonesia 41.0 82.0 85.9 163.3 5.3 16.3 - 81.0
Malaysia 5.5 11.0 3.6 15.0 6.7 24.6 41.7 97.4
Philippines 21.4 53.5 - 50.0 3.5 13.4 24.0 109.9
Singapore 0.8 0.8 5.5 8.1 8.0 20.4 - 62.7
Thailand 14.0 28.0 32.7 55.8 - 7.3 - 58.4
China 50.0 100.0 339.4 678.8 14.9 24.7 60.6 140.7
Hong Kong 0.6 0.6 3.2 3.2 2.6 4.9 - 6.4
Taiwan 1.3 2.1 5.8 9.3 8.6 14.7 - 48.8
Canada 0.8 2.3 1.8 6.6 - 2.3 - 13.4
USA 0.2 0.2 --- 2.4 - 8.1
Mexico 5.4 10.8 1.8 7.8 - 2.2 - 21.8
Chile 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.0 7.7 11.3 39.0 57.4
R. Cairnsa 2.7 6.5 11.8 15.9 0.2 9.0 8.1 33.2
EU 0.3 0.7 3.6 4.6 - 2.3 - 12.3
R. Worldb 16.4 32.8 114.0 215.0 - 8.2 6.4 51.5
World 3.2 0.9 13.2 3.9 1.5 3.8 1.1 11.5
a The rest of the Cairns group (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay). b The rest of the world. This region
is almost entirely composed of non-APEC developing countries. - Nil.
Source: FTAP2 database.
In Dee and Hanslow (2000), additional barriers are imposed on cross-border trade in
services. They appear as an export tax, the export tax rates being derived from the
importing region’s barriers on the output of foreign affiliates. This is done to reflect
the assumption that exporting regions receive the rents created by the barriers
imposed by importing regions on the output of foreign affiliates.
As FTAP2 focuses on trade in telecommunications and financial services, the
treatment of border restrictions is modified to suit the unique features of these
services. The studies from which the estimated tax equivalents on the output of
domestic firms and foreign affiliates are drawn, capture the effects of all barriers to
trade in these services, that is both domestic barriers and cross-border trade barriers.
As a result, no additional border restrictions are necessary in modelling the effects




Furthermore, imposing an export tax, as in FTAP, to capture the effects on cross-
border trade of restrictions to ongoing operations, assumes that exporting regions
can benefit from an importing region’s barriers. The ability of exporting regions to
extract rents from importing region’s barriers is constrained by their own domestic
market conditions. If exporting regions have a competitive domestic market, it is
difficult for individual exporters to retain these rents. This is another reason why no





This chapter outlines the policy options for services trade liberalisation, modelled in
this study, in the context of the GATS framework and the types of trade barriers
removed in each option. A simplified model is subsequently introduced to highlight
the main effects of the unilateral removal of different trade barriers, in order to aid
in understanding the effects of multilateral trade liberalisation.
3.1 Trade liberalisation under the GATS
The GATS encompasses a number of basic principles (see box 3.1), one of which is
that member countries undertake scheduled commitments specifying conditions for
foreign service suppliers to gain access to their domestic markets. Article XVI of
the GATS covers market access requirements that apply only to sectors covered in
the schedule. This article requires that each member gives no less favourable
treatment to service suppliers of other members than is provided in its schedule of
commitments. These commitments outline the minimum access that may be
available to foreign service suppliers. Thus market access can be free or conditional,
depending on a country’s commitments specified in the specific schedules. Article
XVI also sets out six forms of measures affecting free market access that may not
be applied to foreign service suppliers for the sectors for which commitments are
made unless their use is clearly provided for in the schedule. These six elements
cover all aspects of limitation of market access that can be specified in national
schedules (WTO Secretariat 1999). The provisions of the market access article
actually extend beyond those of national treatment to cover some non-
discriminatory measures, that restrict access but do not discriminate against
foreigners as such (Hoekman 1995; Snape and Bosworth 1996). Further, the articles
relating to monopolies and exclusive service suppliers require a member to ensure
that monopoly suppliers are not allowed to act in a manner inconsistent with the
member’s obligations under the agreement.
Article XVII of the GATS covers national treatment, by stating that in the sectors
covered by the schedule and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out in
the schedule, each member shall give treatment to foreign services and service
suppliers no less favourable than it gives to its own domestic services and service
suppliers. This basic obligation is similar to the national treatment rule in Article IIIPOLICY OPTIONS 21
of the GATT, but is limited to service sectors for which commitments have been
given in the schedule of the country concerned. Each member country can set up
conditions or qualifications for the access of foreign services or service suppliers to
its domestic market in the commitment schedule. Like the GATT-bound tariff, these
conditions outline the worst treatment that may be given to foreign service suppliers
(WTO Secretariat 1999).
Box 3.1 Basic principles of the GATS
•   All services are covered by the GATS. However, the annex on air transport
excludes major aspects of this sector from coverage of the GATS.
•   Most-favoured-nation treatment applies to all services except for the provision for
the one-off temporary exemptions.
•   National treatment applies in the areas where commitments are made.
•   Transparency in regulations and inquiry points is required.
•   Regulations have to be objective and reasonable.
•   International payments are normally unrestricted.
•   Individual countries’ commitments are negotiated and bound.
•   Progressive liberalisation through further negotiations was mandated in the UR.
Source: WTO (2001) and WTO Secretariat (1999).
This differs from the GATT, in which the right to national treatment is universal for
all goods. National treatment in the GATS is specific only to those sectors in which
commitments have been undertaken, that is, positive listing is required. This is
partly due to the nature of trade in services. Particularly in the case of commercial
presence and the presence of natural persons, granting national treatment virtually
means a complete removal of all regulatory advantages enjoyed by domestic service
suppliers, and thus gives foreign service suppliers free access to a country’s internal
market (WTO Secretariat 1999).
This study models the estimated barriers to entry for domestic service firms, along
with the barriers for foreign service suppliers, in the telecommunications and
financial services sectors. This is because in these sectors entry is also regulated for
domestic firms. For instance, one or a few state-owned enterprises may dominate an
entire nation’s supply of telecommunications and entry may be restricted for
domestic firms as well as foreign affiliates.
Domestic regulations can also restrict competition in the domestic market and act as
entry barriers to all firms. The existence of such barriers implies that gains can be
reaped if liberalisation is also extended to domestic markets. Such liberalisation hasLIBERALISING TRADE
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significant ramifications for trade liberalisation as well, as these barriers are equally
applicable to foreign service suppliers. Under the GATS’s national treatment rule, if
barriers for domestic suppliers are lowered in scheduled sectors, similar treatment
should also be extended to foreign suppliers to ensure equal market access unless
otherwise provided in a member’s schedules of commitments.
3.2 Liberalisation scenarios modelled
Three trade liberalisation scenarios are analysed for each of the two service sectors
examined in this study: removing restrictions on national treatment, removing
barriers to market access, and a combination of the two. The first two are partial
liberalisation scenarios while the third is a complete liberalisation scenario.
Restrictions on national treatment are discriminatory in nature as they are biased
against foreign service suppliers. Granting foreign service suppliers national
treatment requires the host region to lower the barriers for affiliates to the same
level as for domestic firms. This implies that all discriminatory barriers on foreign
affiliates’ output and capital are removed. This is modelled in the national treatment
scenarios. It should also be noted that non-discriminatory barriers, where they exist,
still apply in the national treatment scenarios.
Market access barriers are non-discriminatory in nature, imposed on both domestic
and foreign service suppliers. In this scenario, barriers are reduced equally for
domestic firms and foreign affiliates in a host region. This leaves any discriminatory
barriers, where they exist, in place.
In all three scenarios a long-run equilibrium situation is simulated in which trade
barriers are removed and the prices of all goods, services and factors of production
respond to clear their respective markets in all regions. In the long run, each
region’s capital owner is allowed to respond to the policy changes by reallocating
its capital across sectors and regions to maximise their returns. As the analysis is
comparative static, the results only show the differences between two equilibrium
outcomes, that is, the changes or percentage changes in the model’s endogenous
variables from the current equilibrium with all barriers in place to a new equilibrium
in which some or all barriers have been removed.1
                                             
1 This is different from FTAP, which is a comparative static model with wealth accumulation as
developed by McDougall (1993). FTAP allows for the accumulation of wealth over a 10 year
period, so that model results show the changes or percentage changes in endogenous variables
from the equilibrium which would exist 10 years hence with all barriers in place, and a new




4 Liberalising trade in
telecommunications
This chapter examines three multilateral liberalisation scenarios for the
telecommunications sector: two partial (national treatment and market access) and
one complete.1 Table 4.1 presents the tax equivalents of post-UR barriers to trade in
telecommunications listed in table 2.2 broken down in terms of the restrictions on
market access and national treatment. In market access liberalisation, non-
discriminatory barriers to establishment and ongoing operations that apply for both
domestic firms and foreign affiliates are completely removed, leaving only
discriminatory barriers on foreign affiliates in place. In national treatment
liberalisation, only barriers that discriminate against foreign affiliates are removed.
In other words, the barriers for foreign affiliates are lowered to the same level as for
domestic firms, leaving only non-discriminatory market access barriers in place.
Table 2.2 indicates that the developing regions have much higher barriers than
developed regions. Indonesia, China and the rest of the world have the highest
barriers of all developing regions, while Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Chile and
Mexico have the lowest. The barriers in all developed regions are consistently low.
The most discriminatory barriers are among developing regions, with Indonesia, the
Philippines, Thailand, China, and the rest of the world heading the list.
                                             
1 It should be noted that the results presented in this chapter for the complete liberalisation scenario
assume that the restrictions to trade in financial services remain intact. This scenario was also run
with the assumption that the restrictions to trade in financial services had been removed. The
results were almost identical in the two cases. For this reason, only the results for the former
scenario are presented.LIBERALISING TRADE
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Table 4.1 Estimated tax equivalents of post-UR barriers to trade in
telecommunications (per cent)
Market access - domestic and foreign National treatment - foreign
  Region
Output Capital Output Capital
Australia - 1.4 --
New Zealand - 1.3 --
Japan - 1.8 --
Korea 2.5 4.8 2.4 4.4
Indonesia 41.0 85.9 41.1 77.4
Malaysia 5.5 3.6 5.5 11.4
Philippines 21.4 - 32.6 50.0
Singapore 0.8 5.5 - 2.6
Thailand 14.0 32.7 14.0 23.1
China 50.0 339.4 50.0 339.4
Hong Kong 0.6 3.2 --
Taiwan 1.3 5.8 0.8 3.5
Canada 0.8 1.8 1.5 4.8
United States 0.2 ---
Mexico 5.4 1.8 5.6 6.0
Chile 1.3 1 --
Rest of Cairnsa 2.7 11.8 3.8 4.1
European Union 0.3 3.6 0.4 1.0
Rest of World 16.4 114.0 16.6 101.0
a This group is made up of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay. - Nil.
Source: Adapted from Warren (2000b).
4.1 Global and regional effects
Table 4.2 shows the percentage changes in real GNP, by region and for the world as
a whole, of the three liberalisation scenarios. The world as a whole benefits in all
three liberalisation scenarios. In the complete liberalisation scenario the world is
projected to gain 0.1 per cent in world real GNP, or about US$24 billion. This is
equal to the combined global gains from the two partial liberalisation scenarios. The
projected global GNP gains from national treatment and market access liberalisation
are 0.01 and 0.09 per cent or US$1.5 and US$22.8 billion, respectively.
The global gains from complete liberalisation mainly come from the removal of
non-discriminatory market access barriers. This result seems influenced by the
incidence of the barriers and the share of FDI in this sector. Firstly, not all regions
have discriminatory barriers in telecommunications. Secondly, and not
unexpectedly, the most significant discriminatory barriers exist only in regions in
which foreign firms have a low penetration in the domestic telecommunications




lead to large gains for the world as a whole. In contrast, all regions have non-
discriminatory market access barriers. Therefore removal of these barriers is
expected to lead to larger gains for the world as a whole, compared with the
removal of discriminatory barriers.
Table 4.2 Projected effects on real GNP of three multilateral trade
liberalisation scenarios for telecommunications
Region National treatment Market access Complete
liberalisation
%%%
Australia 0.00 0.06 0.06
NZ 0.00 0.09 0.09
Japan 0.04 0.04 0.04
Korea 0.00 0.01 0.01
Indonesia -0.77 0.36 0.70
Malaysia 0.00 -0.03 -0.03
Philippines 0.22 -0.01 0.72
Singapore 0.04 0.00 0.02
Thailand -0.01 -0.35 -0.35
China -0.39 0.79 0.81
Hong Kong 0.64 0.25 0.16
Taiwan -0.01 0.02 0.02
Canada 0.00 0.01 0.01
USA 0.02 0.01 0.01
Mexico 0.00 -0.07 -0.06
Chile 0.00 0.01 0.01
R. Cairnsa 0.00 0.01 0.02
EU 0.02 0.05 0.05
R. Worldb -0.01 0.38 0.39
World 0.01 0.09 0.10
a  The rest of the Cairns group (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay). b The rest of the world. This region
is almost entirely composed of non-APEC developing countries.
Source: FTAP2 model projections.
Regional distribution of global gains
The distribution of the global gains among regions is different in different policy
scenarios. National treatment liberalisation gives all investing regions better access
to other regions’ domestic markets. Regions with high discriminatory barriers and
large inflows of FDI may lose. This is because as foreign affiliates expand their
market share at the expense of domestic firms, they benefit from the existing market
access barriers and repatriate the rents that arise as a consequence.2
                                             
2 This possibility has been canvassed by Francois and Wooton (1999).LIBERALISING TRADE
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Table 4.2 shows that major investing regions, such as Japan, the United States of
America, (USA) and the European Union (EU), all benefit from national treatment
liberalisation, while high barrier regions such as Indonesia, China and the rest of the
world all lose. Hong Kong benefits the most because of its close trade and
investment ties with China and China’s remaining high market access barriers.
Almost all regions gain from the removal of market access barriers in
telecommunications. This is because all regions have market access barriers in
telecommunications and, therefore, benefit directly from removing these barriers.
For investing regions, further gains come from freer access to other regions’
domestic markets. For recipient regions, as the barriers are removed increased
competition reduces the price of telecommunications to users. This stimulates the
demand for these services and for capital used by the telecommunications sector. As
a result, real GNP increases with the biggest winners being China, the rest of the
world and Indonesia.
Four regions, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Mexico, are worse off under
market access liberalisation. All these economies have market access barriers.
However, both market access barriers and barriers to national treatment are high in
the Philippines and Thailand and low in Malaysia and Mexico. When the market
access barriers are removed, all these economies suffer terms of trade losses
commensurate with the size of the barriers. However, the gains from liberalisation
do not offset the terms of trade losses, leading to overall losses in these economies.
In the case of the Philippines and Thailand, the remaining high barriers to national
treatment prevent foreign affiliates from significantly expanding their market share
in the domestic telecommunications sector. As a result, there are no significant
gains from increased inward FDI in these economies. In the case of Malaysia and
Mexico, however, their low initial market access barriers means that the direct
benefits from liberalisation are low relative to other regions. Moreover, since all
four of these regions are not significant international investors in
telecommunications themselves, they cannot take advantage of other regions’
liberalisation.
It is worth noting that for regions with high barriers (usually developing regions),
the gains from complete liberalisation tend to be greater than the sum of the gains
from the two partial liberalisation scenarios. For regions with low barriers (usually
developed regions), the gains from complete liberalisation tend to be smaller than
the sum of the gains from the two partial liberalisation scenarios. This is because,
compared to complete liberalisation, partial liberalisation leaves some barriers, and
therefore rents, in place, thus reducing the gains for high barrier regions and




effects are absent, thus there are extra gains for high barrier regions and extra losses
for low barrier regions.
Complete liberalisation of trade in telecommunications leads to a gain for all
regions, except Malaysia, Thailand and Mexico. Table 4.2 shows that the
distribution of the gains across regions is close to the distribution in market access
liberalisation. This suggests that market access liberalisation dominates the regional
effects of complete liberalisation in this sector.
Sources of global and regional gains
The percentage change in real GNP for each region can be decomposed into various
contributing factors.3 For analytical convenience, these factors are grouped into five
effects:
•   allocative effects;
•   terms of trade effects;
•   net capital endowment effects;
•   product variety effects; and
•   net FDI income effects.
Allocative effects measure changes in resource allocation as a result of policy
changes. For instance, the expansion of a subsidised sector (in net terms), due to a
policy change, is measured as a loss because the sector, which is already ‘too big’
compared with an undistorted equilibrium, has grown even larger. Similarly, a
sector which is taxed (in net terms), is already ‘too small’ relative to an undistorted
equilibrium. Thus if trade liberalisation causes it to expand, it moves closer to this
undistorted equilibrium and represents a gain. The same logic applies to
internationally mobile factors, such as capital. Increases in capital endowments will
bestow a gain on a region in which capital is taxed, while decreases in capital
endowments in that region will cause a loss.
Terms of trade effects measure the changes in the relative price of exports and
imports for a region. Where export prices rise more quickly than import prices, or
export prices fall less quickly than import prices, there is a terms of trade gain for
that region.
                                             
3 The percentage changes in real GNP are analysed using the GTAP welfare decomposition (Huff




The net capital endowment effect measures the changes in the rental value of the net
(of depreciation) capital stock located within a region, due to changes in the rates of
return on capital located within a region. The capital stock located within a region is
made up of the domestically owned and foreign-owned capital stock. An increase in
the net capital endowment in a region, due to liberalisation, results in a rise in real
GNP for the region concerned through its contribution to the region’s production.4
Product variety effects refer to the benefits that the increased variety of a particular
good or service may provide for consumers. In the model, an increase in the output
of a given sector means more firms and more varieties for consumers to choose
from. This bestows a benefit to consumers in that region.
Net FDI income effects embrace three different forms of income for a region: the
normal rentals received by the owners of foreign capital from host regions, less
normal rentals paid to the owners of foreign capital in home regions; the barrier
rents received by the owners of foreign capital and affiliates from host regions less
the barrier rents paid to the owners of foreign capital and affiliates in home regions;
and the income received or paid on foreign credit or debt by a region.5
For the world as a whole, only allocative effects, net capital endowments and
product variety contribute to the changes in real GNP.6 These three effects can be
referred to as ‘income generating’ factors. The other effects do not change world
total GNP, and can therefore be referred to as ‘income redistributing’ factors. That
is, what constitutes a gain for one region is a loss for other regions.
For the world as a whole, whether a policy change is beneficial or not depends on
income generating factors rather than income redistribution factors. At the regional
level, however, both types of contributing factors are important. The contributions
of the five effects to the change in regional and world GNP are presented in table
4.3. The results are taken from the complete liberalisation scenario. The row sums
of the five contributors, listed in the last column, equal the change in real GNP.
                                             
4 This effect captures the so-called ‘capital diversion’ effect for economies with already low
barriers.
5 This last effect is typically quite small in FTAP2 projections, so it is not discussed in latter parts
of the text when examining the projected effects of liberalisation.
6 By assumption, the asset value of the world capital stock does not change in the model. The
change here is to the rental value of the world capital stock, due to changes in the rates of return
to capital assets caused by trade liberalisation. Trade liberalisation changes the rental value of
capital assets used by each region, leading to changes in real GNP. Appendix A shows how in a
two country, partial equilibrium setting, movements of capital between regions can increase the




Table 4.3 Sources of changes in real GNP of complete trade liberalisation













Australia -26 269 -57 -26 43 204
NZ -6 54 -3 - 3 48
Japan -177 1 751 -826 -359 1 168 1 559
K o r e a 3 6 - 5 - 1 3 11 63 5
Indonesia 1 152 -434 1 303 401 -1 151 1 258
Malaysia 17 -30 - -5 -3 -22
Philippines 440 -189 523 163 -475 458
Singapore 3 6 -16 4 15 13
Thailand 37 -562 60 17 -55 -502
China 5 575 -1 301 354 1 037 -343 5 321
Hong Kong -45 378 -441 -123 390 160
Taiwan 34 13 -22 -2 20 43
Canada -68 124 -38 -9 33 42
USA -339 1 386 -1 203 -298 1 114 662
Mexico -4 -166 65 19 -56 -143
Chile -10 32 -25 -6 16 7
R. Cairnsa -42 200 -10 -15 18 151
EU -347 4 077 -717 -347 850 3 518
R. Worldb 14 370 -5 638 1 898 2 485 -1 604 11 502
World 20 600 -34 833 2 938 - 24 313
a The rest of the Cairns group (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay). b The rest of the world. c The sum
of the terms of trade effects on GNP do not sum exactly to zero due to numerical inaccuracy in solving the
model. d This is equal to the row sum. - Nil.
Source: FTAP2 model projections.
For the world as a whole, the single most important contributor is the gain from
allocative effects. This is primarily the result of the reallocation of capital between
regions and the reallocation of capital and labour between sectors within regions.
This alone generates around 85 per cent of the estimated total increase in world real
GNP. The world also gains from increases in both net capital endowments and
product variety. The former is related to a global revaluation of capital assets used
in each region. The latter is related to output expansion because product variety
increases as output expands.
For individual regions both the income generating and income redistribution factors
determine the changes in real GNP. The extent to which regional GNP is affected
depends on the characteristics of each region. As shown in table 4.3, the net change
for a given region is the result of the interaction of all these effects.
Despite its positive effect for the world as a whole, the contribution of allocative
effects to individual regions’ GNP may not always be positive. As table 4.3 shows,LIBERALISING TRADE
IN SERVICES
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the distribution of these gains across regions tends to be in favour of high barrier
regions and, sometimes, at the expense of regions that have a more open
telecommunications sector.
For a given region these effects consist of two sub-effects which are largely driven
by the movement of capital between regions. The first is the combined effect
derived from changes in the size of production of all goods and services sectors
within a region. These changes in output are driven by the movement of capital and
labour between sectors within a region, and the movement of capital between
regions. For highly protected regions this effect tends to be positive overall, as these
regions experience the largest increases in capital and hence total output. For other
regions these effects tend to be either small negatives or small positives, depending
on  the size of the change in their capital stock.
The second sub-effect is the effect derived from the change in the overall size of the
capital stock in each region, and the change in the capital stock in each sector within
a region. As capital is taxed in all regions, when capital moves from low barrier
investing regions to high barrier regions the former tend to lose and the latter tend to
gain, relative to an undistorted equilibrium.
Table 4.4 reports the relative importance of these two sub-effects for all regions.
Each sub-effect is presented as a percentage of the change in allocative effects for
each region. These percentages sum to either –100 or 100 depending on whether
allocative effects make a negative or positive contribution to real GNP.
Decreases in capital explain a significant proportion of the overall loss from
allocative effects for most liberal regions, including Australia, Japan, Hong Kong,
the USA and the EU. On the other hand, changes in output explain a significant
proportion of the overall allocative effects for highly protected regions, including
Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Mexico, Chile and
the rest of the Cairns group. In general, regions using more capital tend to
experience a gain from allocative effects, while regions using less capital tend to
experience a loss from allocative effects.
In contrast to the effect on real GNP of allocative effects, the terms of trade effects
tend to transfer real GNP from high barrier regions to low barrier regions. High
barrier regions are expected to experience a worsening terms of trade, while other
regions experience an improving terms of trade. This is because the barriers in the
highly protected regions raise the price of their exports relative to the price of their
imports. When the barriers are removed, the relative price of exports to imports
                                             
7 Net taxes refers to all taxes (export, import, output and intermediate input taxes) net of all




tends to fall in high barrier regions and rise in other regions. This represents a
correction of the distortions in the relative prices of exports and imports in all
regions.
Table 4.4 Decomposition of three effects on real GNP of complete trade
liberalisation in telecommunications
Sub-effects as a percentage of each main effect










Australia -27 -73 -63 -37 89 11
NZ -83 -17 -54 -46 74 26
Japan 36 -136 -96 -4 103 -3
Korea 86 14 -172 72 46 54
Indonesia 40 60 26 74 -98 -2
Malaysia 100 - -296 196 -257 157
Philippines 80 20 20 80 -101 1
Singapore 167 -67 -81 -19 127 -27
Thailand -157 257 12 88 -106 6
China 53 47 25 75 -108 8
Hong Kong - -100 -108 8 104 -4
Taiwan 91 9 -81 -19 146 -46
Canada -94 -6 -60 -40 107 -7
USA -41 -59 -74 -26 110 -10
Mexico -350 250 15 85 -115 15
Chile -70 -30 -31 -69 84 16
R. Cairnsa -240 140 -210 110 164 -264
EU -40 -60 -87 -13 88 12
R. Worldb 30 70 63 37 -99 -1
World 37 63 -450 550 --
a The rest of the Cairns group (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay). b The rest of the world. - Nil.
Source: FTAP2 model projections.
The net capital endowment effect measures the change in the capital stock, net of
depreciation, used in each region. This effect can be decomposed into two sub-
effects, the changes in domestically owned capital and inward FDI. When policy
changes cause a reallocation of capital from low to high barrier regions, both
domestically owned capital and inward FDI tend to increase in the latter and
decrease in the former. An expansion in domestically owned capital can be financed
by reducing outward FDI. Increased inward FDI in highly protected regions can be
financed by low barrier regions reducing their FDI in other low barrier regions or
their domestically owned capital stock. Generally, the GNP effect of this




Table 4.4 reports the relative importance of these two sub-effects in determining the
overall net capital endowment effect for all regions. Of all the regions experiencing
an overall gain in net capital endowments, the rest of the world is the only one in
which the gain is dominated by increased FDI. It is likely that this is due to intra-
regional FDI being counted as domestically owned capital in this region. For low
barrier regions the loss in net capital endowments is generally dominated by the loss
in domestically owned capital.
With capital being the only factor mobile among regions, the change in regional
gross domestic product (GDP)8 is reflected largely in the change in regional capital
endowments. Given the general trend of capital reallocation from low to high
barrier regions, GDP normally falls in the former and rises in the latter. This has a
direct impact on product variety in those regions, as an increase in the output of a
given sector means more firms and more varieties for consumers to choose from. As
a result, the product variety effect tends to reinforce the gains or losses that a region
experiences in its real GDP due to capital reallocation.
The contribution of the net FDI income effect to regional real GNP largely depends
on whether the region concerned is a net FDI supplier or recipient initially. This
effect can be further decomposed into two sub-effects, the effect of net FDI income
and the effect of net FDI rents. The relative importance of these two sub-effects is
reported in table 4.3. Of these two sub-effects, net FDI income is more important
than net FDI rents for all regions except the rest of the Cairns group. A net FDI
supplier benefits from increased FDI income due to increased outward FDI. In
financing outward FDI, the investing region decreases its domestically owned
capital stock. The overall benefit for an investing is the return from FDI.
The opposite is true for regions that are net FDI recipients. As trade liberalisation
tends to reallocate capital assets from net FDI investing regions to net FDI receiving
regions, the net FDI income effect moves in the opposite direction to the capital
flows. Table 4.4 confirms this by showing that net FDI income flows from net FDI
receiving to other regions, with negative net FDI income effects for former and
positive net FDI income effects for the latter. As FDI suppliers lose rents previously
earned in FDI recipient regions, net FDI rents flow from FDI investing regions to
FDI recipient regions. As shown in table 4.3, however, net FDI rents are usually not
as significant a source of gains or losses for most regions as the net FDI income
effect.
In summary, most highly protected regions benefit from allocative effects, net
capital endowments and product variety, while most liberal regions gain from
improvements in their terms of trade and increases in net FDI and bond income.
                                             




Although the change in real GNP for a particular region depends on which of these
effects dominates, the overall majority of regions gain from complete trade
liberalisation of telecommunications.
4.2 Sectoral effects
The projected effects on sectoral output of completely removing barriers to trade in
telecommunications are reported in table 4.5. Given the nature of barriers to
services trade, the regions with the highest barriers to trade in telecommunications
experience the biggest expansion in telecommunications output. These regions
include, among others, China, Indonesia and the rest of the world. The rapid
expansion of telecommunications output is due to the large increase in domestic and
foreign commercial presence in these regions. Telecommunications output for the
world is projected to increase by 1.73 per cent.
Table 4.5 Projected effects on sectoral output of complete trade
liberalisation in telecommunications (per cent)
Region Pria Secb Conc Tt_d Cmne Fibf Osrg Dweh
Australia 0.56 -0.55 -0.46 -0.11 0.08 -0.03 0.03 -0.05
NZ 0.89 -0.60 -0.43 -0.21 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.00
Japan 0.12 -0.10 -0.36 0.03 0.17 -0.03 -0.01 0.03
Korea 0.07 0.08 -0.49 -0.06 1.19 -0.07 -0.04 -0.16
Indonesia 0.21 2.50 3.31 1.39 13.59 0.85 -0.29 1.08
Malaysia 0.22 -0.10 -0.41 -0.37 1.33 -0.06 0.00 -0.16
Philippines 0.74 4.50 1.10 2.19 5.37 0.71 0.69 0.58
Singapore 1.72 0.15 -0.40 -0.67 0.33 -0.08 0.19 -0.37
Thailand 0.69 -0.56 -0.53 0.02 6.95 0.07 -0.33 -0.53
China -0.43 1.02 3.12 0.34 13.78 0.58 -0.11 0.41
Hong Kong -0.31 -1.31 -1.99 -0.24 -0.20 -0.47 -0.40 -0.44
Taiwan 0.15 0.03 -0.54 -0.17 0.84 -0.01 0.00 -0.14
Canada 0.46 -0.08 -0.50 -0.06 0.48 -0.04 -0.01 -0.12
USA 0.35 -0.11 -0.44 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.03 -0.04
Mexico 0.18 0.30 -2.27 -0.26 1.54 -0.13 -0.22 0.01
Chile 0.46 -0.41 -1.03 -0.09 0.23 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06
R. Cairnsi 0.32 -0.12 -1.03 0.02 2.12 -0.05 -0.08 -0.13
EU 0.35 -0.17 -0.32 -0.01 0.60 -0.04 0.00 -0.07
R. Worldj -0.40 0.78 2.44 0.19 11.36 0.39 -0.27 -0.67
World 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.02 1.73 0.00 -0.03 -0.12
a Primary industries. b Secondary industries. c Construction. d Trade and transport. e Telecommunications. f
Financial services. g Other services. h Dwellings. i  The rest of the Cairns group (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia
and Uruguay). j The rest of the world.
Source: FTAP2 model projections.LIBERALISING TRADE
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The expansion of output occurs through increased output of domestic firms and
foreign affiliates in almost all regions. On the demand side, the fall in the price of
telecommunications relative to other goods and services encourages consumers to
switch from other goods and services to telecommunications. Furthermore, as total
GNP rises in highly protected regions, the demand for all goods and services rises,
as evidenced by the significant rise in consumption expenditure in real terms in
those regions.
The effects on the output of other sectors can be explained by the changes in
resource allocation. That is, as liberalisation causes telecommunications output to
rise, this is generally accompanied by a reduction in the output of other sectors, as
resources shift from the latter to the former. If the barriers removed are substantial,
a region can attract more foreign capital to enlarge its total capital endowment, and
the output of other sectors may not fall at all. This is the case with the Philippines.
More often than not, however, the expansion of telecommunications output is
accompanied by reductions in the output of at least some other sectors.
The impact of removing barriers to trade in telecommunications on other sectors of
a regional economy also depends on the changes in the relative rates of return to
factors which are mobile or immobile between regions. When capital moves from
open regions to highly protected regions, the expected rate of return to capital rises
in the former relative to that in the latter. Thus the rate of return on capital, relative
to immobile factors of production, rises in open regions and falls in highly protected
regions. In response to these changes in relative factor returns, firms in open regions
tend to use more labour and other immobile factors and less capital in order to
minimise their production costs, while firms in highly protected regions tend to use
more capital and less labour and other immobile factors. As a result, the sectors
intensive in the use of immobile factors of production are encouraged to expand
more rapidly in liberal regions, while the sectors intensive in the use of capital
expand more rapidly in highly protected regions. For example, primary industries in
Australia, Japan, the USA and the EU all experience strong growth relative to other
sectors. In contrast, secondary industries in Indonesia, the Philippines and China all
experience strong growth relative to other sectors.
For the world as a whole, the primary sector has the second highest rate of
expansion in output, following the telecommunications sector. In fact, there are only
three regions not experiencing an expansion in their primary sectors under the
liberalisation of telecommunications: China, Hong Kong and the rest of the world.
In general, the expansion in the primary sector tends to be larger in low barrier
regions than in high barrier regions. Furthermore, in some low barrier regions the
primary sector has the highest output growth rate of all sectors (Australia, New




primary sector generally has one of the lowest growth rates among all sectors, if not
the lowest.
The differences in primary output expansion among regions can be explained by the
special features of the primary sector, as well as the changes in the rates of return to
other factors. The primary sector is the only sector that uses the sector-specific
factors of production land and natural resources. As the supply of land and natural
resources is fixed at the sectoral level within regions, when capital endowments fall
in open regions and rise in highly protected regions, the return to (and rental cost of)
land and natural resources relative to capital, tends to fall in the former and rise in
the latter. The immobility of land and natural resources means that primary
producers must fully pass on the changes in primary factor costs to users, regardless
of any change in the rental costs of other factors, such as capital and labour. As a
result, the price of primary goods falls more in open regions than in highly protected
regions. The demand for the primary exports of liberal regions increases, as the
demand in highly protected regions for primary goods shifts from domestically
produced goods to imports. On the other hand, in liberal regions, the demand shifts
from imports to domestically produced primary goods. An interesting general
equilibrium result seems to be that liberalising trade in a service sector tends to
cause an expansionary effect on the production of primary goods in low barrier
regions, and boosts their exports of primary goods to high barrier regions.LIBERALISING TRADE
IN SERVICES
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5 Liberalising trade in financial
services
This chapter examines three multilateral liberalisation scenarios for the financial
services sector: two partial (national treatment and market access) and one
complete.1 Table 5.1 lists the estimated tax equivalents of post-UR restrictions on
market access and national treatment to trade in financial services. All regions have
discriminatory restrictions on national treatment in financial services, whereas
market access barriers are not present in all regions. Most developed regions have
low or no market access barriers. In contrast, developing regions maintain more
significant market access barriers than developed regions, and their discriminatory
barriers are generally much higher again.
5.1 Global and regional effects
Table 5.2 details the aggregate changes in regional and world real GNP brought
about by each of the three multilateral liberalisation scenarios for financial services.
Complete liberalisation of financial services is expected to generate a gain in the
world real GNP of US$23 billion, or a 0.1 per cent increase. This is equal to the
combined gains from the two partial liberalisation scenarios. The projected global
gains from national treatment and market access liberalisation are about US$22.4
and US$0.4 billion, respectively.
                                             
1 It should be noted that the results presented in this chapter for the complete liberalisation scenario
assume that the restrictions to trade in telecommunications remain intact. This scenario was also
run with the assumption that the restrictions to trade in telecommunications had been removed.
The results were almost identical in the two cases. For this reason, only the results for the former




Table 5.1 Estimated tax equivalents of post-UR barriers to trade in
financial services (per cent)
Market access – domestic and foreign National treatment - foreign
Region Output Capital Output Capital
Australia -- 1.4 43.3
New Zealand -- 1.9 8.5
Japan 5.8 - 1.9 3.0
Korea 14.9 - 3.7 80.7
Indonesia 5.3 - 11.0 81.0
Malaysia 6.7 41.7 17.9 55.7
Philippines 3.5 24.0 9.9 85.9
Singapore 8.0 - 12.4 62.7
Thailand -- 7.3 58.4
China 14.9 60.6 9.8 80.1
Hong Kong 2.6 - 2.3 6.4
Taiwan 8.6 - 6.1 48.8
Canada -- 2.3 13.4
United States -- 2.4 8.1
Mexico -- 2.2 21.8
Chile 7.7 39.0 3.6 18.4
Rest of Cairnsa 0.2 8.1 8.8 25.1
EU -- 2.3 12.3
Rest of World - 6.4 8.2 45.1
a This group is made up of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay. - Nil.
Source: Adapted from Kalijaran et al. (1999).
The global gains from complete liberalisation mainly come from the removal of
discriminatory barriers. This result seems influenced by the incidence of the barriers
and the share of FDI in this sector. Firstly, not all regions have non-discriminatory
barriers in financial services. Secondly, the most significant non-discriminatory
barriers exist only in regions in which foreign firms have a low penetration in the
domestic financial services sector (see table 2.1). Therefore, the removal of these
barriers is not expected to lead to large gains for the world as a whole. In contrast,
all regions have discriminatory barriers to national treatment, with a number of
developed economies having very high discriminatory barriers to establishment.
Therefore removal of these barriers is expected to lead to larger gains for the world
as a whole, compared with the removal of non-discriminatory barriers.
Regional distribution of global gains
In the national treatment liberalisation scenario, all regions are expected to gain
except China, which experiences an insignificant loss. In terms of changes in real
GNP, the biggest winners are Thailand, Mexico, the Philippines  and Indonesia. AllLIBERALISING TRADE
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these regions have high discriminatory barriers, particularly to establishment. FDI
investing regions also benefit from better market access to these high barrier
regions. Table 5.2 shows that the three major FDI investing regions, Japan, the USA
and the EU, all benefit.
Table 5.2 Projected effects on real GNP of three multilateral trade
liberalisation scenarios for financial services
Region National treatment Market access Complete Liberalisation
Australia 0.04 0.01 0.05
NZ 0.42 -0.01 0.40
Japan 0.01 0.01 0.01
Korea 0.08 -0.01 0.36
Indonesia 0.59 -0.09 0.70
Malaysia 0.17 -0.03 0.27
Philippines 0.70 -0.51 0.93
Singapore 0.29 0.00 0.73
Thailand 1.00 -0.01 0.96
China 0.00 0.04 0.06
Hong Kong 0.12 0.26 0.27
Taiwan 0.02 -0.04 0.03
Canada 0.07 -0.04 -0.01
USA 0.01 -0.01 -0.02
Mexico 0.74 -0.04 0.69
Chile 0.04 0.14 0.24
R. Cairnsa 0.54 0.01 0.70
EU 0.07 -0.01 0.05
R. Worldb 0.16 0.00 0.17
World 0.09 0.00 0.09
a  The rest of the Cairns group (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay). b The rest of the world.
Source: FTAP2 model projections.
The removal of market access barriers for financial services has a negligible effect
on real GNP for most regions. This is because most regions have no or low market
access barriers.
Table 5.2 shows that complete liberalisation tends to benefit high barrier regions
more than low barrier regions. In the two partial liberalisation scenarios, however,
the distribution of the global gains is not always in favour of high barrier regions.
Take China as an example. The removal of barriers to national treatment leads to a
minor fall in real GNP for China and a rise in real GNP for Hong Kong which is a
major investor in China. Removal of barriers to national treatment leaves market
access barriers in place, which transfers rents from China to other economies that




national treatment liberalisation. It is only when complete liberalisation is
undertaken that the negative effects (that is, the rents) of existing barriers can be
avoided for the high barrier regions. This suggests that, with complete liberalisation,
economies with high barriers will benefit more from complete liberalisation than
from the combination of the two partial liberalisation scenarios. This result was also
observed when liberalising trade in telecommunications.
Overall, most economies are expected to gain from complete liberalisation of trade
in financial services. The biggest winners are South-East Asian and Latin American
economies. The USA and Canada are the only two countries projected to be slightly
worse off. Examining the decomposition of the changes in real GNP helps trace the
sources of these gains or losses for each region.
Sources of global and regional gains
Table 5.3 presents the contributions of five effects to the changes in world and
regional real GNP for all regions. The complete liberalisation of financial services
trade is expected to increase world real GNP by around US$24 billion. Unlike
telecommunications liberalisation, however, the most important contributor to this
gain is the increase in net capital endowments, which accounts for about 63 per cent
of the projected change in world real GNP. Compared with telecommunications,
there is a much larger flow of FDI across regions when financial services are
liberalised. Two differences between telecommunications and financial services
influence this result. Firstly, all regions have barriers to national treatment in
financial services, especially barriers to establishment or capital. Secondly, foreign
affiliates have a higher penetration of domestic financial services markets prior to
liberalisation. As a result, financial services liberalisation causes a much greater
proportion of the world capital stock to be reallocated across regions. Therefore, the
gains from this capital reallocation, measured as the contribution of net capital
endowments, dominate the gains in world real GNP.
Gains from allocative effects (US$6 billion) and product variety (US$2 billion)
contribute to 29 and 9 per cent, respectively, of the change in world real GNP. The
distribution of gains from allocative effects across regions tends to favour highly
protected regions at the expense of the major FDI investing regions, such as Japan,
the USA and the EU.LIBERALISING TRADE
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Table 5.3 Sources of changes in real GNP of complete trade liberalisation













Australia 2 126 14 1 11 154
NZ 117 -15 210 66 -158 218
Japan -2 672 1 348 -4 618 -2 350 8 592 354
Korea 796 -578 1 826 663 -1 229 1 468
Indonesia 753 -340 2 245 549 -1 943 1 250
Malaysia 262 -112 150 70 -144 226
Philippines 796 -820 1 146 331 -853 591
Singapore 326 -259 460 205 -290 440
Thailand 703 -266 2 311 453 -1 797 1 396
China 1 221 -1 157 104 322 -106 384
Hong Kong -1 340 -260 -87 281 275
Taiwan 88 -188 240 82 -151 71
Canada 22 -108 31 -10 27 -38
USA -1 511 1 794 -5 720 -1 555 5 887 -1 091
Mexico 1 004 -540 3 249 719 -2 718 1 701
Chile 178 -96 142 37 -124 136
R. Cairnsa 3 092 -749 11 839 2 839 -10 296 6 625
EU -1 529 1 775 -3 880 -1 749 8 739 3 375
R. Worldb 2 817 -172 4 676 1 527 -3 728 5 108
World 6 463 -16 14 164 2 112 0 22 640
a  The rest of the Cairns group (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay). b The rest of the world. c The sum
of the terms of trade effects on GNP do not sum exactly to zero as expected due to numerical inaccuracy in
solving the model. d This is equal to the row sum.
Source: FTAP2 model projections.
Table 5.4 reports the relative importance of two sub-effects on the overall allocative
effects for all regions: the effect of changes in output and the effect of changes in
capital usage. Each sub-effect is presented as a percentage of the overall allocative
effects in each region. These percentages sum to either –100 or 100 depending on
whether there is a loss or gain from allocative effects.
The table shows that the large low barrier regions (Japan, the USA and the EU)
experience a loss from allocative effects as the capital stock declines, with Japan
and the USA experiencing a loss in output as well. The EU experiences a gain from
allocative effects on output, but this gain is not great enough to offset the loss from
a smaller capital stock. In contrast, all high barrier regions experience a gain from
the allocative effects of a larger capital stock, largely because of FDI inflows.





Table 5.4 Decomposition of three effects on real GNP of complete trade
liberalisation in financial services
Sub-effects as a percentage of each main effect










Australia - 100 -898 998 -202 302
NZ 42 58 19 81 -136 36
Japan -48 -52 -137 37 105 -5
Korea 75 25 35 65 -120 20
Indonesia 30 70 25 75 -101 1
Malaysia 66 34 20 80 -107 7
Philippines 72 28 28 72 -110 10
Singapore 71 29 25 75 -117 17
Thailand 64 36 29 71 -106 6
China 48 52 -28 128 -190 90
Hong Kong 2990 -3090 -320 220 67 33
Taiwan 71 29 -18 118 -114 14
Canada 127 -27 -1714 1614 33 67
USA -32 -68 -131 31 117 -17
Mexico 60 40 19 81 -109 9
Chile 32 68 -2 102 -117 17
R. Cairnsa 52 48 23 77 -106 6
EU 10 -110 -169 69 107 -7
R. Worldb 61 39 31 69 -108 8
World 83 17 -303 403 --
a  The rest of the Cairns group (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay). b The rest of the world.
Source: FTAP2 model projections.
The terms of trade effects of liberalising financial services transfer real income from
highly protected to more open regions. Highly protected regions experience a
worsening of their terms of trade, while liberal regions experience an improvement
in their terms of trade (see table 5.3). This is because the barriers in highly protected
regions restrict the supply of financial services and raise the price of exports relative
to the price of imports. When the barriers are removed, the relative price of exports
to imports falls in highly protected regions and rises in liberal regions.
The net capital endowment effect measures the change in the capital stock located
in each region. In contrast to liberalising telecommunications trade, financial
services liberalisation increases FDI for all regions (see tables 5.4). This is because
all regions have some discriminatory barriers to the establishment and ongoing
operations of foreign affiliates, and these are typically higher than in
telecommunications. The removal of these barriers provides an incentive for inwardLIBERALISING TRADE
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FDI in all regions. However, whether a region experiences an overall gain in net
capital endowments is determined by what happens to domestically owned capital.
The increase in total FDI worldwide is driven, in the main, by the large FDI
investing regions (Japan, the USA and the EU). Their outward FDI is financed from
their domestically owned capital stocks. In the case of these three countries, the
reduction in their domestically owned capital is significant enough to outweigh the
positive effect of increased inward FDI, thus causing an overall fall in their net
capital endowments with a negative effect on their real GNP. On the other hand,
high barrier regions experience no such negative effect. Instead, their domestically
owned capital stocks increase, along with inward FDI, because removing their
relatively high market access barriers increases the demand for domestically owned
and foreign-owned capital.
The change in net capital endowments also, indirectly, determines the change in
product variety. Increased net capital endowments means increased GDP. As capital
is the only interregionally mobile factor of production, given capital reallocation
from the low barrier to high barrier regions, GDP normally falls in the former and
rises in the latter. Gains or losses in real GNP associated with changes in product
variety are correlated with any changes in GDP and, therefore, with changes in net
capital endowments. Table 5.3 shows that the product variety effect and the net
capital endowment effect move in the same direction.
The contribution of the net FDI income effect to regional real GNP largely depends
on whether the region concerned is a net FDI investor or recipient. As with
telecommunications liberalisation, net FDI income is a more important factor in
determining the overall net FDI effect for almost all regions than FDI rents, as
demonstrated in table 5.4.
In summary, most highly protected regions benefit from allocative effects, net
capital endowments and product variety, while most low barrier regions gain from
improvements in the terms of trade and increases in net FDI income. Although the
change in real GNP for a particular region depends on which of these effects
dominates, the overall majority of regions gain from complete liberalisation of trade
in financial services.
The USA and Canada are the only regions that are not projected to benefit from
liberalisation of financial services. The USA has significant commercial presence in
many regions in which there are substantial barriers to financial services. The USA
already benefits from other regions’ trade barriers and receives rents earned by its
foreign affiliates. When other regions liberalise their financial services, the USA
benefits from increased FDI income from liberalising regions, but loses rents and




and therefore output. As the world’s largest investor, the losses exceed the gains
marginally, resulting in a small fall in real GNP.
5.2 Sectoral effects
The projected effects of complete liberalisation of trade in financial services on
sectoral output in all regions are presented in table 5.5. World output of financial
services is projected to increase by 0.61 per cent, which is the largest increase
experienced by any sector.
Table 5.5 Projected effects on sectoral output of complete trade
liberalisation in financial services (per cent)
Region Pria Secb Conc Tt_d Cmne Fibf Osrg Dweh
Australia 0.15 -0.09 -0.16 -0.05 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.01
NZ 0.88 1.15 0.68 0.70 0.50 0.76 0.36 0.65
Japan -0.61 -0.90 -0.43 -0.74 -0.61 2.06 -0.93 -0.72
Korea -0.37 1.38 0.89 0.30 0.32 4.85 -0.34 -0.33
Indonesia 0.61 4.82 1.84 2.12 1.50 3.81 1.55 1.17
Malaysia -0.27 0.57 0.97 0.91 0.44 2.97 0.63 0.18
Philippines 0.98 7.32 3.77 5.45 1.82 5.12 4.34 0.65
Singapore 0.90 0.93 1.62 2.28 0.52 3.12 2.23 -0.32
Thailand 0.30 3.84 1.45 3.25 1.24 2.94 1.41 1.33
China -0.37 0.46 0.82 -0.16 0.16 3.31 -0.12 0.27
Hong Kong -0.34 -1.17 -1.53 -0.13 -0.17 0.63 -0.30 -0.50
Taiwan 0.11 0.37 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 1.28 -0.20 -0.02
Canada 0.18 -0.07 -0.29 0.02 -0.01 0.16 0.02 -0.13
USA -0.05 -0.36 -0.45 -0.14 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 -0.19
Mexico 0.96 3.83 0.88 1.76 1.21 1.79 0.99 1.64
Chile 0.00 -0.20 1.66 0.25 0.16 4.61 0.03 -1.77
R. Cairnsi 1.59 3.04 2.03 1.72 1.09 2.38 0.86 0.72
EU -0.04 -0.31 -0.42 -0.16 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08
R. Worldj 0.09 0.61 0.32 0.31 0.23 0.77 0.24 0.05
World 0.04 0.02 -0.12 -0.06 -0.06 0.61 -0.07 -0.06
a Primary industries. b Secondary industries. c Construction. d Trade and transport. e Telecommunications.
f Financial services. g Other services. h Dwellings. i The rest of the Cairns group (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay
and Colombia). j The rest of the world.
Source: FTAP2 model projections.
Given the nature of barriers to services trade, the regions with the highest barriers to
trade in financial services experience the biggest expansion in their financial
sectors. These include the Philippines, Korea, Chile and Indonesia. Only the USA
and the EU experience a slight fall in the output of their financial services sectors.
In fact, these two regions experience a fall in the output of all sectors. This is aLIBERALISING TRADE
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direct result of reallocating their capital from domestic sectors to other regions, in
response to general liberalisation.
On the other hand, high barrier regions generally record positive growth in almost
all other sectors. This is in contrast to telecommunications liberalisation where
some sectors expand and others contract. This difference results from the
importance of financial services as an intermediate input into the production of
other goods and services, relative to telecommunications.
Financial services are a relatively more important intermediate input into
production, compared with telecommunications. The share-weighted average of
financial services in total production costs for the world as a whole is 8.8 per cent,
compared with 1.5 per cent for telecommunications. Thus, removing a given barrier
in financial services will lead to a larger fall in the production costs and output
prices of all sectors using them as their intermediate inputs and in their output
prices. Sectoral outputs are expected to respond to the changes in their prices.
The largest reductions in the price of financial services occur in the regions with the
highest barriers. As the price of both financial services and non-financial services
sectors in high barrier regions fall, the demand for their exports increases. This
helps drive the strong output expansion of both financial services and non-financial
services sectors in high barrier regions, which requires increased capital in these
sectors. Moreover, the rise in the real GNP in high barrier regions also pushes up
their consumption of all goods and services, which provides another impetus for
domestic output expansion.
At the global level the primary and secondary sectors experience the largest and
second largest expansions, respectively, after the liberalising sector. This result was
also observed with the liberalisation of telecommunications. At the regional level
the changes in the output of these two sectors diverges between low and high barrier
regions. In low barrier regions the primary sector usually experiences the largest
expansion or smallest contraction, after the financial services sector. In high barrier
regions the secondary sector usually experiences the largest expansion, after the
financial services sector. As with telecommunications liberalisation, these divergent
effects are driven by changes in the relative rates of return to factors which are
mobile or immobile between regions. These changes tend to cause firms in open
regions to use more labour and other immobile factors and less capital in order to
minimise their production costs, while firms in highly protected regions tend to use
more capital and less labour and other immobile factors. As a result, the sectors
intensive in the use of immobile factors of production are encouraged to expand
more rapidly or contract less quickly in liberal regions, that is, primary industries.
While the sectors intensive in the use of capital expand more rapidly in highly
protected regions, that is, secondary industries.CONCLUSION 45
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents a quantitative analysis of the possible effects on the regional
and world economies of liberalising trade in two key service sectors:
telecommunications and financial services. These are sectors for which WTO
members have undertaken commitments for trade liberalisation. However, these
commitments are for partial rather than complete liberalisation. By modelling the
effects of complete liberalisation of these two sectors, this study is intended to add
impetus for further commitments for trade liberalisation in these sectors by WTO
members. The analysis is based on a multi-region and multi-sector CGE model,
FTAP2.
6.1 General results
The results of trade liberalisation depend, to a large extent, on the incidence and
nature of the trade barriers in the regions and economies of the world. Barriers to
trade in telecommunications and financial services are generally much higher in
developing regions than in developed regions. Consequently, regions with relatively
high barriers and, therefore, significant scope to liberalise gain most from
liberalisation. Non-discriminatory market access barriers are more significant in
telecommunications trade. Discriminatory national treatment barriers are more
significant in financial services trade. Given the nature of the barriers, most of the
gains from telecommunications liberalisation come from the removal of non-
discriminatory barriers, whereas most of the gains from financial services
liberalisation come from the removal of discriminatory barriers. Removing barriers
to trade in telecommunications and financial services is projected to increase world
real GNP by about 0.2 per cent.
Removing all barriers to trade in telecommunications is projected to increase world
real GNP by 0.1 per cent. For the world as a whole, the single most important
contributor is the gain from allocative effects. This is primarily the result of the
reallocation of capital between regions and the reallocation of capital and labour
between sectors within regions. Despite its positive effect for the world as a whole,
the contribution of allocative effects to individual regions’ GDP may not always be
positive. The distribution of gains from allocative effects across regions tends to be
in favour of highly protected regions and, sometimes, at the expense of regions thatLIBERALISING TRADE
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have more open telecommunications sectors. Decreases in capital explain a
significant proportion of the overall losses from allocative effects for most
developed and FDI investing regions. In contrast to the effect on real GDP of
allocative effects, the terms of trade effects tend to transfer real GNP from highly
protected regions to less protected regions. Highly protected regions are expected to
experience a worsening terms of trade, while other regions experience an improving
terms of trade.
The world also gains from both increases in net capital endowments and product
variety. The former is related to a global revaluation of capital assets (and therefore
capital productivity) used in each region. The latter is related to output expansion
because product variety increases as output expands. High barrier regions tend to
gain from increases in net capital endowments and product variety, whereas liberal
regions tend to lose output from decreases in net capital endowments and product
variety. In contrast to the real GNP effects from changes in net capital endowments
and product variety, high barrier regions lose from decreased net (of payments) FDI
income, and low barriers regions gain from increased net (of payments) FDI
income.
Regions with the highest barriers to trade in telecommunications experience the
biggest expansion in telecommunications output. The effects on the output of other
sectors can be explained by the changes in resource allocation. That is, as
liberalisation causes telecommunications output to rise, this is generally
accompanied by a reduction in the output of other sectors, as resources shift from
the latter to the former.
Removing all barriers to trade in financial services increases world real GNP by
0.09 per cent. Given the nature of the barriers to trade in financial services,
liberalisation causes a much greater proportion of the world capital stock to be
reallocated across regions via FDI. Therefore, the gains from this capital
reallocation, measured as the contribution of net capital endowments, dominate the
gains in world real GNP. Low barrier regions which increase their outward FDI
usually experience losses in net capital endowments, whereas high barrier regions
which experience increases in inward FDI experience gains in net capital
endowments. The second most important contributor to the gains in world real GNP
is the gain in allocative efficiency. Similar to telecommunications liberalisation, the
distribution of allocative efficiency gains across regions tends to be in favour of
highly protected regions and, sometimes, at the expense of regions that have more
open telecommunications sectors. Decreases in capital explain a significant
proportion of the overall allocative efficiency losses for most developed and FDI
investing regions.CONCLUSION 47
The losses from changes in net capital endowments and allocative effects
experienced by low barrier regions are more than offset by increased net (of
payments) FDI income. The gains from changes in net capital endowments and
allocative effects experienced by high barrier regions are partially offset by
decreased net (of payments) FDI income. Highly protected regions also experience
losses from terms of trade effects and gains from product variety effects, while
liberal regions experience gains from terms of trade effects and losses from product
variety effects. The regions with the highest barriers to trade in financial services
experience the biggest expansion in their financial sectors.
The impact of removing barriers to trade in telecommunications and financial
services on other sectors of a regional economy, depend not only on the reallocation
of resources, but also on the changes in the relative rates of return to factors which
are mobile or immobile between regions. When capital moves from open regions to
highly protected regions, the expected rate of return to capital rises in the former
relative to that in the latter. Thus the rate of return on capital, relative to immobile
factors of production, rises in open regions and falls in highly protected regions. In
response to these changes in relative factor returns, firms in open regions tend to use
more labour and other immobile factors and less capital in order to minimise their
production costs, while firms in highly protected regions tend to use more capital
and less labour and other immobile factors. As a result, the sectors intensive in the
use of immobile factors of production are encouraged to expand more rapidly in
liberal regions, while the sectors intensive in the use of capital expand more rapidly
in highly protected regions. For example, primary industries in liberal regions tend
to experience strong growth relative to other sectors. In contrast, secondary
industries in highly protected regions tend to experience strong growth relative to
other sectors.
6.2 Policy implications
One of the general results of liberalising either of the two services sectors examined
in this study is that gains accrue to almost all regions. Thus, on the basis of the
modelling almost all regions would have an incentive to participate in multilateral
liberalisation of trade in these two sectors. Greater gains accrue to high barrier
regions than to other regions.
The estimated gains from liberalising telecommunications and financial services are
not large. This is due, in part, to the non-substitutability of cross-border supply with
domestic services. Not all services have this characteristic. Therefore, it would
inappropriate to generalise the size of the gains estimated here to liberalisation in
other service sectors. Furthermore, the model used to simulate trade liberalisation isLIBERALISING TRADE
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comparative static, and like most comparative static models dynamic gains are not
captured in the results.
The two sectoral liberalisation scenarios that have been examined in this paper have
assumed that any existing distortions in other sectors remain in place. That is,
liberalising trade in telecommunications is simulated under the assumption that the
trade barriers in financial services are still intact. The results indicate that existing
distortions in other sectors do not interact in a significant way to undermine the
benefits of trade liberalisation in the liberalising sector.
The results also show that the order in which complete liberalisation of each of
these services sectors is conducted has no bearing on the results. The two sectoral
liberalisation scenarios that have been examined in this paper have assumed that
any existing distortions in other sectors remain in place. The same scenarios were
also conducted on the basis that any existing distortions in other sectors had already
been removed. That is, liberalising trade in telecommunications was simulated
under the assumption that the trade barriers in financial services had been removed.
The results, at the global as well as at the regional level, remained very close to
those observed under the assumption that the existing distortions in other sectors
remained in place. Therefore, the sequence in which these services sectors are
liberalised should not be of concern.
The results do seem to suggest that the type of liberalisation that is undertaken for a
given services sector may be important. Chapters 4  and 5  have  demonstrated  that
almost all the gains from telecommunications liberalisation come from removing
market access barriers, while almost all the gains from financial services
liberalisation come from removing barriers to national treatment. This prompts the
view that partial liberalisation in these sectors may be sufficient to realise most of
the gains. While this is true for the world as a whole, it is not true for individual
regions. The results show that partial liberalisation of removing only market access
barriers in telecommunications or barriers to national treatment in financial services,
leads to a lower gains for many high barrier regions compared with the gains from
complete liberalisation. Therefore, upon closer inspection complete liberalisation is
still the preferred strategy as it is expected to bring more benefits for most regions,
especially those with relatively high barriers.
6.3 Agenda for future work
Further work on services trade liberalisation can be undertaken in a number of
areas. Two are highlighted here.CONCLUSION 49
The current model only captures the static gains from trade liberalisation (for
example, allocative efficiency). In reality, there are dynamic gains from trade
liberalisation as well. In a dynamic setting, a rise in real GNP also increases
savings, which can be used to finance future investment and the accumulation of
capital. An increase in the capital stock leads to further growth in GNP. The model
used to simulate the policy changes is comparative static, and like most comparative
static models dynamic impacts are not captured in the results. Thus, the estimated
gains from the liberalisation scenarios could be interpreted as the lower bounds of
all the potential gains to regional and world economies. Identifying these static
gains sheds some light on the pattern of interregional distribution of gains from the
proposed trade liberalisation scenarios. These static gains are important as they can
trigger a growth effect on regional economies in a dynamic setting that, to a large
extent, reinforces the initial static gains. Further work is needed to extend the model
to incorporate some key dynamic features, such as investment behaviour and capital
accumulation.
Furthermore, with greater sectoral detail it will be possible to extend the current
analytical framework to estimate trade liberalisation in other services sectors, such
as wholesale and retail trade, business services, health, education, maritime
transport and electricity.LIBERALISING TRADE
IN SERVICES
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A A diagrammatic illustration of the
comparative static gains from
removing barriers to commercial
presence
This appendix demonstrates the comparative static effects of removing barriers to
the commercial presence of foreign affiliates using a simple diagram. Barriers to
commercial presence of foreign affiliates are essentially barriers to capital mobility
between countries. Thus, the impact of removing barriers to commercial presence is
similar to the impact of removing barriers to capital mobility between countries.
Figure A.1 illustrates the impact of a barrier to foreign capital on the investing
country and the host country, and the gains from removing this barrier. The figure
combines the capital markets of two countries, A and B. The horizontal axis
measures the total capital stock for this two-country world. The total capital stock is
divided between two countries as indicated by the vertical supply curve S: KA is
owned by country A while KB is owned by country B. The vertical axis measures
the rate of return to capital (or the value of the marginal product of capital). The two
downward-sloping curves DA and DB represent the marginal product of capital and
hence the demand for capital in country A and B, respectively. Labour is assumed
to be fixed and immobile between the two countries. The terms of trade are also
assumed to be constant and there is no change in cross-country trade barriers.
The figure indicates that country A is more capital-abundant than country B. At the
equilibrium point E, country A’s supply of capital exceeds its demand, whereas
country B’s supply of capital is less than its demand. With no barriers to capital
flow between the two countries, country A will invest in country B equal to the
distance EH in the form of FDI. Now suppose that country B imposes a ban on FDI.
Country B experiences a shortage of capital and the rate of return on capital equals
rB. Country A is affected by country B’s policy change and the capital measured by
the distance EH is forced to stay at home. This depresses the rate of return to capital
to rA. The difference between rB and rA reflects the rent per unit of capital generated
by the barrier for country B’s capital owner.  After the ban,- world total income and
output are equal to the areas OAFIJGOB, of which OAFIJK accrues to country A and




When the barrier to foreign capital is removed and capital is allowed to move
between country A and country B, country A will invest in country B until the rate
of return equals r*. Country A’s investment in country B is in the form of FDI and
is measured by the distance EH. In this new equilibrium, world total income and
output is equal to the area OAFEGOB, of which OAFEHK represents country A’s
income and KHEGOB represents country B’s income. Compared to when the ban
was in place, world income and output is greater by the area EIJ, of which area D
represents the gain in income for country A and area C represents the gain in
income for country B. These gains arise from a more efficient use of capital within
a static setting. In terms of output, country’s A output has contracted by the area
EIKL, whereas country B’s output has increased by the area EJKL.
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B Modelling commercial presence in
the FTAP2 model
As in FTAP, foreign commercial presence in FTAP2 is represented by foreign
affiliates of multinational firms, and these firms and their affiliates are identifiable
by location, ownership and sector. The region in which the firm’s operations are
located is referred to as the host region, while the region from which the firm
originates is referred to as the home region.
In each sector of a host region, goods or services may be produced by domestic and
foreign affiliates simultaneously. Like domestic firms, foreign affiliates have their
own cost structure for intermediate inputs and primary factors. They also have their
own domestic sales and exports. Foreign affiliates compete with domestic firms and
with each other, not only in the host region’s domestic markets but also in foreign
markets for their exports.
Foreign affiliates of multinational firms are assumed to source capital from their
home regions and other factors of production from host regions. Given input prices
and output demands, firms are assumed to select a combination of inputs to
minimise production costs.
Specialising in a given sector, firms can potentially locate their affiliates in the same
sector of any region. The exact location or commercial presence of a firm, however,
is determined by the supply of capital by the home region’s capital owner and the
demand for output by the host region’s consumers.
B.1 Supply of capital
Commercial presence of foreign affiliates in host regions is driven by the firm’s
desire to maximise the return for the capital owner. Figure B.1 shows how capital is
allocated by the capital owner to the region’s multinational firms across sectors and
allocated by the firm in each sector across regions.COMMERCIAL
PRESENCE IN FTAP2
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Figure B.1 Allocation of capital by a home region
Source: Modified from figure 2.3 of Hanslow, Phamduc and Verikios (1999).
Figure B.1 indicates that each region has a given endowment of wealth.1 The wealth
owner, the representative household, is assumed to maximise returns by allocating
wealth across all sectors of the region. Wealth is composed of equity in productive
assets and net bond holdings (net foreign debt). Equity is made up of land, natural
resources and physical capital. Of these three, only capital is mobile. As such, the
allocation of wealth essentially involves deciding on the allocation between capital
and net foreign debt. As the proportion of foreign debt in regional income is fixed
by assumption, the wealth owner’s decision is in fact reduced to one about how
capital should be allocated between a region’s firms across all sectors.
In the model, capital is allocated at two levels. At the regional level, capital is
allocated by its owner across all sectors. Within each sector, there is a collective
regional multinational firm. Sectoral capital can be allocated by this multinational
firm between the home region and foreign regions, and across all foreign regions.
                                             
1 As opposed to FTAP, regional wealth is assumed to be fixed in FTAP2. In preliminary
simulations the wealth accumulation mechanism generated unexpected results. This is because
FTAP links wealth accumulation to net bond holdings, which become so dominant in some
regions that it distorts the effect of reallocation of physical capital. By fixing regional wealth and
removing wealth accumulation, the effect of bonds can be minimised. This treatment is also
consistent with the comparative static nature of the current study.
Bonds
Land Capital Natural resources






















The outward allocation of capital represents the region’s outward FDI, which is
invested in the firm’s foreign affiliates.
The capital owner in each region intends to maximise returns by moving capital
from low rate of return sectors to high rate of return sectors. The multinational firm
in each sector maximises the return for its capital owner by investing in its parent
firm at home and affiliates overseas. The returns to capital for each region are
maximised when the expected rates of return to all capital owned by that region, and
used by all firms located at home or abroad, are equalised. The enclosed area in
figure B.1 indicates the location of these firms.
It should be noted that while FTAP2 incorporates investment flows, the dynamics of
investment and savings behaviour is not included. This is important for interpreting
simulation results using FTAP2 as the welfare gains will be understated.
B.2 Demand for firm-specific products
The location of a firm’s operations is also influenced by the demand for its products
by consumers in the host region where the firm’s operation is located.
The products of domestic firms and foreign affiliates located in the same region are
assumed to be imperfect substitutes. Consumers are assumed to maximise utility by
selecting a particular bundle of differentiated goods and services to suit their needs.
As foreign affiliates compete with domestic firms in the same region, the demand
for a given good or service determines the location or commercial presence of
foreign affiliates. The demand structure of the model is similar to FTAP, and is
represented in figure B.2.
At the top node of the nesting in figure B.2, the consumer can choose between
composite goods from domestic or foreign locations. At the second node, the
consumer can also choose composite imports from a particular source region. At the
third node of the nesting, the consumer can choose a domestically produced good
produced by a foreign affiliate or by a domestic firm. The consumer can also choose
an imported good produced by a firm located in any other region.2
                                             
2 This treatment assumes that from an Australian perspective, for example, a good produced by a
US multinational located in Australia is a closer substitute for a good produced by an Australian
firm than it is for a good produced by a US firm located in the United States.COMMERCIAL
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Figure B.2 Structure of the demand for a firm-specific product by a host
region
Source: Adapted from figure 2.2 of Hanslow, Phamduc and Verikios (1999).
The bottom node of the nesting in figure B.2 shows that the good produced by each
firm in either the domestic region or foreign regions, is a composite of all the
varieties of individual firms within that group. This implies firm-level product
differentiation associated with large-group monopolistic competition (Francois,
McDonald and Nordstrom 1995). With such firm-level product differentiation, the
consumers of each region can benefit from having more varieties to choose from, as
it is more likely for them to find a product or service which best suits their
particular needs. This increased choice is modelled as a gain for consumers in each
region.3
Consumer choices are modelled in a nest of constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
utility functions. The values for the elasticities used for the first and second nodes of
the demand nesting (levels one and two in figure B.2) vary by commodity. For
telecommunications and financial services these elasticities are set to zero. For all
other commodities they are the same as those used in Dee and Hanslow (2000). The
                                             
3 The model structure assumes that each firm’s output is fixed, so that the output of a sector can
only expand or contract via an expansion or contraction in the number of firms in that sector.
Coupled with the assumption of firm-level product differentiation, a contraction or expansion in




















































values used for the elasticity of substitution between goods produced by firms from
different home regions but located in the same host region (level three in figure B.2)
is 7.5, smaller than the value of 10 used in the initial implementation of FTAP.4 The
values used for the elasticity of substitution between different firm types (level four
in figure B.2) is set at 15, which is the same as in FTAP.
                                             
4 A smaller value is chosen because FTAP2 assumes a higher degree of capital mobility than
FTAP. The original value used in FTAP assumes a degree of substitution that is inconsistent with




To support the theoretical structure of the FTAP2 model and to simulate the
removal of all barriers to trade in services, the database must contain information
on:
•   bilateral FDI stocks1 by region and sector;
•   rental returns to FDI by region and sector; and
•   barriers to the establishment and operation of domestic firms and foreign
affiliates.
Bilateral FDI stocks at the sectoral level are estimated from APEC (1995), United
Nations (1999) and a wide range of publications by various international
organisations as well as individual countries (see Verikios and Zhang 2001). These
sources provide information on total inward and outward FDI stocks by region and
broad sectors. With this information, a RAS procedure is used to generate a
consistent database of bilateral FDI stocks by region and sector. The resulting
inward and outward FDI stocks by region and sector are largely consistent with the
three-sector database used in Dee and Hanslow (2000), and are summarised in
tables C.1 and C.2.
As shown in tables C.1 and C.2, the database retains the same regional detail as in
Dee and Hanslow (2000), but provides greater sectoral detail. The tables show the
sources and destinations of FDI stocks in seven of the eight sectors in the database.
The EU, the USA and Japan are the main sources of FDI, accounting for 36, 23 and
17 per cent of total outward FDI stocks, respectively. Both the EU and the USA are
also the main destinations of FDI, receiving about the same amount of FDI as they
invest abroad. Unlike the EU and the USA, however, Japan’s outward FDI far
exceeds its inward FDI. Japan is the source of 83 per cent of total net outward FDI,2
making it the single most important net FDI exporter in the world. Among
developing countries, Indonesia is the largest recipient, receiving 29 per cent of the
total net inward FDI stocks.3 The next most important net FDI importers are
Mexico (10 per cent), China (9 per cent) and Malaysia (5 per cent).
                                             
1 ‘FDI stocks’ refers to the stocks of capital that are owned by foreign affiliates.
2 Total net outward FDI stocks are the sum of regional net outward FDI stocks.
3 Total net inward FDI stocks are the sum of regional net inward FDI stocks.LIBERALISING TRADE
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Table C.1 Outward FDI stocks by home region and sector, 1995 (US$
million)
Region Pria Secb Conc Tt_d Cmne Fibf Osrg Total
Australia 9,807 6,622 550 1,293 498 358 2,326 21,453
N Zealand 695 1,459 82 568 48 110 330 3,293
Japan 49,987 87,043 2,058 53,845 8,585 46,818 27,973 276,309
Korea 4,508 1,340 26 178 12 124 104 6,292
Indonesia 217 775 41 261 23 116 89 1,523
Malaysia 247 781 30 369 0 5 89 1,520
Philippines 0 144 12 77 5 41 362 642
Singapore 1,797 3,933 174 1,191 73 869 694 8,731
Thailand 0 120 25 170 14 124 102 554
China 548 129 49 115 3 29 37 910
H Kong 6,625 14,614 289 1,829 170 6,066 3,808 33,400
Taiwan 100 5,282 0 324 0 267 316 6,290
Canada 12,721 33,478 0 5,804 114 11,714 7,548 71,380
USA 84,235 161,579 370 50,749 5,494 58,855 5,222 366,505
Mexico 177 433 21 261 14 138 73 1,117
Chile 0 177 7 51 2 31 30 299
R Cairnsh  657 1,519 72 487 30 293 284 3,341
EU 140,863 235,818 4,160 76,714 9,001 86,049 29,642 582,246
R. Worldi  54,548 98,904 4,755 32,395 23 3,245 19,050 212,920
Total 367,733 654,149 12,723 226,680 24,110 215,253 98,078 1,598,726
a Primary industries. b Secondary industries. c Construction.  d Trade and transport. e Telecommunications.  f Finance,
insurance and business services. g Other services.  h The rest of the Cairns group (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and
Colombia). i The rest of the world.
Source: FTAP2 database.
The tertiary sector makes up 36 per cent of all FDI stocks, compared with 23 per
cent for the primary sector and 41 per cent for the secondary sector. Within the
tertiary sector, the trade and transport sector (tt_) has the largest share, 14 per cent,
followed by financial services (fib), 14 per cent and other services 6 per cent. The
telecommunications sector has less than 2 per cent of the total FDI stocks.
FDI accounts for around 2 per cent of the world capital stock. Services sectors
receive proportionally less foreign capital than non-services sectors. The world
average FDI share is only 0.9 per cent for telecommunications and 1.4 per cent for
financial services.
The expected rates of return to capital are obtained from an updated version of the
GTAPICM4 database, which fully implements the UR. Rental returns to FDI are
derived by multiplying FDI stocks by the corresponding rates of return. The FDI
capital rental shares are then used in splitting the total output of each sector in the
                                             
4 GTAPICM is a version of the GTAP model (Hertel 1997) incorporating international capital
mobility (Verikios and Hanslow 1999).DATABASE
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updated GTAPICM database into production by domestic firms and foreign
affiliates.
Table C.2 Inward FDI stocks by host region and sector, 1995 (US$ million)
Region Pria Secb Conc Tt_d Cmne Fibf Osrg Total
Australia 14,207 13,137 524 12,274 627 388 5,030 46,188
N Zealand 1,700 3,134 79 207 138 3,576 478 9,312
Japan 0 16,230 101 5,332 289 61,720 4,315 87,987
Korea 0 4,216 63 218 169 868 1,858 7,392
Indonesia 77,550 5,305 218 537 33 181 434 84,258
Malaysia 6,946 7,272 608 1,545 21 27 292 16,711
Philippines 3,178 862 20 156 22 397 210 4,845
Singapore 0 11,682 329 2,981 42 268 59 15,361
Thailand 1,550 4,002 1,227 2,024 11 1,213 673 10,701
China 3,902 15,557 289 905 2 47 5,418 26,120
H Kong 4,315 5,691 336 3,572 916 9,127 546 24,503
Taiwan 0 11,823 12 554 61 268 1,218 13,937
Canada 5,610 47,006 4,104 7,503 155 9,866 2,741 76,987
USA 28,899 131,977 2,215 93,630 7,153 35,393 52,637 351,905
Mexico 5,680 10,714 86 6,217 225 7,918 494 31,335
Chile 9,757 995 52 934 106 107 400 12,351
R. Cairnsh 8,182 32,968 297 5,332 523 8,342 2,286 57,931
EU 148,818 222,269 0 59,536 13,586 72,066 4,583 520,858
R. Worldi 47,438 109,308 2,163 23,222 29 3,479 14,405 200,044
Total 367,733 654,149 12,723 226,680 24,110 215,253 98,078 1,598,726
a Primary industries. b Secondary industries. c Construction.  d Trade and transport. e Telecommunications.  f Finance,
insurance and business services. g Other services.  h The rest of the Cairns group (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and
Colombia). i The rest of the world.
Source: FTAP2 database.
The updated GTAPICM database does not contain barriers to trade and foreign
investment in services. These have to be injected into the database separately.
Estimates of the tax equivalents of these barriers for banking and
telecommunications are taken Warren (1999b) and Kalirajan et al. (1999). The
barriers to telecommunications are imposed on the corresponding sector (cmn), and
the barriers to financial services are applied to the entire finance, insurance and
business services sector (fib). This is done using the technique of Malcolm (1998),
described in section 4.2 of Hanslow et al. (2000).LIBERALISING TRADE
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D Estimating tax equivalents of barriers
to trade in telecommunications and
financial services
The estimates of barriers to trade in telecommunications by region are drawn from
Warren (2000b). This study develops a method for examining the impact of entry
barriers, on the consumption of fixed and mobile telecommunications services
within a country. It estimates the impact on average output in the sample countries
if these barriers are removed, and the tariff equivalent of these barriers.
Warren (2000a) assumes that liberalisation increases telephone network penetration
and estimates a number of regression models for mobile network penetration and
fixed network penetration. The dependent variables of those models are proxies for
network penetration. The independent variables include a series of impediment
frequency indexes, which measure discriminatory and non-discriminatory
restrictions to cross-border supply and FDI, as well as proxies for income,
connection waiting lists, quality, household density and population density. All
models had a high degree of explanatory power.
The quantity impacts of the impediment policy variables are separated from other
impacts and converted to price impacts using a price elasticity of demand of -1.2
Warren (2000b). The price impacts are then converted to tariff equivalents. These
estimates are injected into the FTAP2 database to represent the barriers to the
establishment (rents to capital) or ongoing operation (rents to output) of domestic
firms and foreign affiliates in the telecommunications sector.
Kalirajan et al. (1999) develop a model and apply it to 694 banks in 27 economies
to assess the price impact of non-prudential or trade restrictions on the interest
margins of banks. It assumes that high bank profitability reflects a lack of
competition arising from various restrictions and such restrictions impose costs on
banks, which may be passed onto their customers in the form of high prices. As
such, the interest margin of banks can be used to measure the price of banking
services.1
                                             




Kalijaran et al. (1999) apply a two-stage regression model to estimate the impact
that non-prudential restrictions on trade in banking services may have on banks’ net
interest margins. This estimate is then used to derive the price impact of non-
prudential restrictions on trade in banking services in different economies. They
adopt a measure of non-prudential restrictions introduced by McGuire and Schuele
(2000), in which both domestic and foreign restrictiveness indexes are calculated.
The price impact of non-prudential restrictions is calculated by combining the
estimated coefficient for the trade restrictiveness index with the trade restrictiveness
index for each economy. This is done for both domestic and foreign trade
restrictiveness indexes. The estimated tariff equivalents are used in the FTAP2
database to represent the barriers to the establishment (rents to capital) or ongoing
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